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Abstract
The many advantages of cloud computing are increasingly attracting individuals
and organizations to outsource their data from local to remote cloud servers. In
addition to cloud infrastructure and platform providers, such as Amazon, Google,
and Microsoft, more and more cloud application providers are emerging which are
dedicated to oering more accessible and user friendly data storage services to cloud
customers. It is a clear trend that cloud data outsourcing is becoming a pervasive
service. Along with the widespread enthusiasm on cloud computing, however, con-
cerns on data security with cloud data storage are arising in terms of reliability and
privacy which raise as the primary obstacles to the adoption of the cloud. To address
these challenging issues, this dissertation explores the problem of secure and reliable
data outsourcing in cloud computing. We focus on deploying the most fundamental
data services, e.g., data management and data utilization, while considering relia-
bility and privacy assurance.
The rst part of this dissertation discusses secure and reliable cloud data man-
agement to guarantee the data correctness and availability, given the diculty that
data are no longer locally possessed by data owners. We design a secure cloud
storage service which addresses the reliability issue with near-optimal overall per-
formance. By allowing a third party to perform the public integrity verication, data
owners are signicantly released from the onerous work of periodically checking data
integrity. To completely free the data owner from the burden of being online after
data outsourcing, we propose an exact repair solution so that no metadata needs to
be generated on the y for the repaired data.
The second part presents our privacy-preserving data utilization solutions sup-
porting two categories of semantics { keyword search and graph query. For pro-
tecting data privacy, sensitive data has to be encrypted before outsourcing, which
obsoletes traditional data utilization based on plaintext keyword search. We de-
ne and solve the challenging problem of privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked
search over encrypted data in cloud computing. We establish a set of strict privacy
requirements for such a secure cloud data utilization system to become a reality.
We rst propose a basic idea for keyword search based on secure inner product
computation, and then give two improved schemes to achieve various stringent pri-
vacy requirements in two dierent threat models. We also investigate some further
enhancements of our ranked search mechanism, including supporting more search
semantics, i.e., TF  IDF, and dynamic data operations.
As a general data structure to describe the relation between entities, the graph
has been increasingly used to model complicated structures and schemaless data,
such as the personal social network, the relational database, XML documents and
chemical compounds. In the case that these data contains sensitive information
and need to be encrypted before outsourcing to the cloud, it is a very challenging
task to eectively utilize such graph-structured data after encryption. We dene
and solve the problem of privacy-preserving query over encrypted graph-structured
data in cloud computing. By utilizing the principle of ltering-and-verication, we
pre-build a feature-based index to provide feature-related information about each
encrypted data graph, and then choose the ecient inner product as the pruning
tool to carry out the ltering procedure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Cloud computing is the long dreamed vision of computing as a utility, where cloud
customers can remotely store their data into the cloud so as to enjoy the high qual-
ity networks, servers, applications and services from a shared pool of congurable
computing resources [103]. The advantages of cloud computing include on-demand
self-service, ubiquitous network access, location independent resource pooling, rapid
resource elasticity, usage-based pricing, transference of risk, etc. [11] Its great exi-
bility and economic savings are motivating both individuals and enterprises to out-
source their local complex data management system into the cloud.
Along with the widespread enthusiasm on cloud computing, however, concerns
on data security with cloud storage are arising due to unreliability of the service
and malicious attacks from hackers. Recently more and more events on cloud ser-
vice outage or server corruption with major cloud infrastructure providers are re-
ported [2{4,117]. Data breaches of noteworthy cloud services also appear from time
to time [84,99,100]. Besides, the cloud service providers may also voluntarily exam-
1
ine customers' data for various motivations. Therefore, we argue that the cloud is
intrinsically neither secure nor reliable from the view point of the cloud customers.
Without providing strong security, privacy and reliability guarantee, it would be
hard to expect cloud customers to turn over control of their data to cloud servers
solely based on economic savings and service exibility. To address these concerns
and thus motivate the wide adoption of data outsourcing in cloud, in this thesis
we will explore the problem of secure and reliable data outsourcing. We aim at
deploying the most fundamental data services including data management and data
utilization, with built-in reliability and privacy assurance as well as high level service
performance, usability, and scalability.
Firstly, in addition to major cloud infrastructure providers, such as Amazon,
Google, and Microsoft, more and more third-party cloud data service providers are
emerging which are dedicated to oering more accessible and user friendly storage
services to cloud customers [11]. Examples include Dropbox [1] which already has
millions of users. It is a clear trend that cloud storage is becoming a pervasive
service. With the increasing adoption of cloud computing for data storage, assur-
ing data service reliability, in terms of data correctness and availability, has been
outstanding. While existing solutions address the reliability issue by adding data
redundancy to multiple servers, the problem becomes challenging in the \pay-as-
you-use" cloud paradigm where we always want to eciently resolve it for both
corruption detection and data repair. Prior distributed storage systems based on
erasure codes or replication techniques have either high decoding computational
cost for data users, or too much burden of data storage and repair cost for data
owners. Recently Chen et al. [37] proposed a network coding-based storage system
which provides a decent solution for ecient data repair. This scheme, based on
previous work [43, 44, 78, 121], reduces the communication cost for data repair to
2
the information theoretic minimum. This is achieved by recoding encoded packets
in the healthy servers during the repair procedure. However, as network coding uti-
lizes Gaussian elimination for decoding, the data retrieval in terms of computation
cost is more expensive than erasure codes-based systems. Hence, new secure and
reliable storage solutions with the eciency consideration of both data repair and
data retrieval are entailed in the cloud computing.
Secondly, to protect data privacy and combat unsolicited accesses in the cloud
and beyond, sensitive data, e.g., emails, personal health records, tax documents,
nancial transactions, etc., may have to be encrypted by data owners before out-
sourcing to the commercial public cloud [58]; this, however, obsoletes the traditional
data utilization service based on plaintext keyword search. The trivial solution of
downloading all the data and decrypting locally is clearly impractical, due to the
huge amount of bandwidth cost in cloud systems. Moreover, aside from eliminating
the local storage management, storing data into the cloud serves no purpose unless
they can be easily searched and utilized. Thus, exploring privacy-preserving and
eective search service over encrypted cloud data is of paramount importance. Con-
sidering the potentially large number of on-demand data users and huge amount of
outsourced data documents in the cloud, this problem is particularly challenging as
it is extremely dicult to meet also the requirements of performance, system usabil-
ity and scalability. Related works on searchable encryption focus on single keyword
search or Boolean keyword search, and rarely sort the search results. How to design
an ecient encrypted data search mechanism that supports multi-keyword ranking
semantics without privacy breaches still remains a challenging open problem.
Thirdly, we further explore the data search within another category of search
semantics in cloud computing. As a general data structure to describe the relation
between entities, the graph has been increasingly used to model complicated struc-
3
tures and schemaless data, such as the personal social network (the social graph), the
relational database, XML documents and chemical compounds studied by research
labs [38, 91, 92, 128, 132, 133]. Images in the personal album can also be modeled
as the attributed relational graph (ARG) [20]. For the protection of users' privacy,
these sensitive data also have to be encrypted before outsourcing to the cloud. More-
over, some data are supposed to be shared among trusted partners. For example,
the lab director and members are given the authorization to access the entire lab
data. Authorized users are usually planning to retrieve some portion of data they
are interested rather than the entire dataset, mostly because of the \pay-for-use"
billing rule in the cloud computing paradigm. Considering the large amount of data
centralized in the cloud datacenter, the key challenge here is to realize an ecient
encrypted query design which supports graph semantics without privacy breaches.
1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, the fundamental problem of secure and reliable data outsourcing
in Cloud Computing is tackled. The detailed and challenging research tasks we
solved are outlined below:
Secure and Reliable Cloud Storage In Chapter 2, we address the problem of
secure and reliable cloud storage with eciency consideration of both data repair
and data retrieval. By utilizing a near-optimal erasure codes, specically LT codes,
our designed storage service has faster decoding during data retrieval than existing
solutions. To minimize the data repair complexity, we employ the exact repair
method to eciently recover the exact form of any corrupted data. Such a design also
reduces the data owner's cost during data repair since no verication tag needs to
be generated (old verication tags can be recovered as same as data recovery). Our
4
proposed cloud storage service provides a better overall eciency of data retrieval
and repair than existing counterparts. It also completely releases the data owner
from the burden of being online by enabling public integrity check and exact repair.
Portions of the work studied in this chapter were presented as extended abstract at
the 31th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'12) [32].
Privacy-Preserving Multi-Keyword Ranked Search over Encrypted Cloud
Data In Chapter 3, we address the problem of privacy-preserving multi-keyword
ranked search over encrypted data in cloud computing. We establish a set of strict
privacy requirements for such a secure cloud data utilization system. Among various
multi-keyword semantics, we choose the ecient similarity measure of \coordinate
matching", i.e., as many matches as possible, to capture the relevance of data doc-
uments to the search query. We further use \inner product similarity" to quanti-
tatively evaluate such similarity measure. We rst propose a basic idea for ranked
keyword search based on secure inner product computation, and then give two im-
proved schemes to achieve various stringent privacy requirements in two dierent
threat models. We also investigate some further enhancements of our ranked search
mechanism, including supporting more search semantics, i.e., TF  IDF, and dy-
namic data operations. Portions of the work studied in this chapter were presented
as extended abstract at the 30th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
(INFOCOM'11) [30].
Privacy-Preserving Query over Encrypted Graph-Structured Cloud Data
In Chapter 4, we address the problem of privacy-preserving query over encrypted
graph-structured data in cloud computing. Our work utilizes the principle of \ltering-
and-verication". We pre-build a feature-based index to provide feature-related
information about each encrypted data graph, and then choose the ecient in-
ner product as the pruning tool to carry out the ltering procedure. To meet the
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challenge of supporting graph query without privacy breaches, we improve the se-
cure inner product computation to achieve various privacy requirements under the
known-background threat model. Portions of the work studied in this chapter was
presented as extended abstract at the 31th International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems (ICDCS'11) [31].
1.3 Roadmap
The organization of this dissertation is as follows.
Chapter 2 presents our solution for secure and reliable cloud storage. Section
2.1 describes the problem as well as the main idea of our solution. In Section 2.2,
we formulate the problem by introducing the system model, the threat model, our
design goals, and the preliminary. Section 2.3 gives our design rationale, followed
by section 2.4, which describes the proposed scheme. Section 2.5 and 2.6 discuss
security analysis and performance analysis, respectively. We discuss related work
on both network coding-based distributed storage and remote data integrity check
in Section 2.7, and conclude the chapter in Section 2.8.
Chapter 3 presents our proposed privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked search
over encrypted cloud data. Section 3.1 describes the problem as well as the main idea
of our solution. In Section 3.2, we introduce the system model, the threat model, our
design goals, and the preliminary. Section 3.3 describes the framework and privacy
requirements, followed by section 3.4, which describes the proposed schemes. Section
3.5 discusses supporting more search semantics and dynamic operation. Section 3.6
presents simulation results. We discuss related work on both single and Boolean
keyword searchable encryption in Section 3.7, and conclude the chapter in Section
3.8.
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Chapter 4 presents our proposed privacy-preserving query over encrypted graph-
structured cloud data. Section 4.1 describes the problem as well as the main idea
of our solution. In Section 4.2, we introduce the system model, the threat model
and our design goals. Section 4.3 gives preliminaries, and section 4.4 describes
the framework and privacy requirements, followed by section 4.5, which gives our
proposed scheme. Section 4.6 presents evaluation results. We discuss related work
on both keyword searchable encryption and graph containment query in Section 4.7,
and conclude the chapter in Section 4.8.
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation and presents several directions for future
work.
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Chapter 2
Secure and Reliable Cloud Storage
2.1 Introduction
The many advantages of cloud computing are increasingly attracting individuals
and organizations to move their data from local to remote cloud servers [58]. In
addition to major cloud infrastructure providers [11], such as Amazon, Google, and
Microsoft, more and more third-party cloud data service providers are emerging
which are dedicated to oering more accessible and user friendly storage services to
cloud customers. It is a clear trend that cloud storage is becoming a pervasive ser-
vice. Along with the widespread enthusiasm on cloud computing, however, concerns
on data security with cloud storage are arising due to unreliability of the service.
For example, recently more and more events on cloud service outage or server cor-
ruption with major cloud infrastructure providers are reported [3, 4], be it caused
by Byzantine failures and/or malicious attacks. Such a reality demands for reliable
data storage to tolerate certain outage/corruption. In particular, the cloud storage
service should oer cloud customers with capabilities of: 1) timely detection of any
server (and hence data) corruption event, 2) correct retrieval of data even if a limited
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number of servers are corrupted, and 3) repair of corrupted data from uncorrupted
data. Although existing techniques have provided solutions for them individually,
the main challenge for cloud storage service is to simultaneously provide these capa-
bilities at minimal cost. This is because in cloud computing both data storage and
transmission are charged in the \pay-as-you-use" manner. Solutions of high cost will
discourage user engagement and be of less practical use. Moreover, it is important
to set cloud customers free by minimizing the complexity imposed on them in terms
of computation/communication cost and burden of being online.
Existing solutions address the reliability issue by adding data redundancy to
multiple servers. These techniques can be categorized into replication-based solu-
tions and erasure codes-based ones. Data replication is the most straightforward
way of adding redundancy. The advantage of replication is its simplicity in data
management. Repair of data on corrupted servers is also straightforward by simply
copying the entire data from a healthy server. The main drawback of replication is
its high storage cost. Moreover, replication-based solutions cannot satisfy the high-
throughput requirement in distributed storage service like cloud computing, where a
large number of users may access the service concurrently. This is because dierent
users may want to access dierent pieces of data on a server, which would cause less
cache hits but frequent disk I/O requests. [126] provides a detailed analysis on this
drawback.
As compared to its replication-based counterparts, erasure codes-based solutions
can achieve the required reliability level with much less data redundancy [116]. Dif-
ferent from replication-based solutions, erasure codes-based ones are more suitable
for distributed storage systems with concurrent user access. This is because every
block of data on a server is useful for decoding the original data, which leads to a
high cache hit rate of the system. There have been a large number of related works
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on erasure codes-based distributed storage systems [60,61,126]. The main drawback
of existing optimal erasure codes-based systems, however, is the high communication
cost needed for repairing a corrupted storage server. It is commonly believed that
the communication cost is equal to the size of the entire original data [43]. For ex-
ample, Reed-Solomon codes [79] usually need to reconstruct all the original packets
in order to generate a fragment of encoded packets. Taking into consideration the
large amount of data outsourced, the entire data reconstruction is expensive which
makes this solution less attractive. Similarly, existing distributed storage systems
based on near-optimal erasure codes [126] do not have an ecient solution for the
data repair problem or pay no attention to it.
Recently Chen et al. [37] proposed a network coding-based storage system which
provides a decent solution for ecient data repair. This scheme, based on previous
work [43, 44, 78, 121], reduces the communication cost for data repair to the infor-
mation theoretic minimum. This is achieved by recoding encoded packets in the
healthy servers during the repair procedure. However, as network coding utilizes
Gaussian elimination for decoding, the data retrieval in terms of computation cost
is more expensive than erasure codes-based systems. Moreover, [37] adopts so-called
functional repair for data repair, i.e., corrupted data is recovered to a correct form,
but not the exact original form. While this is good for reducing data repair cost, it
requires the data owner to produce new verication tags, e.g., cryptographic mes-
sage authentication code, for newly generated data blocks. As the computational
cost of generating verication tags is linear to the number of data blocks, this de-
sign will inevitably introduce heavy computation/communication cost on the data
owner. Moreover, the data owner has to stay online during data repair.
In this chapter, we explore the problem of secure and reliable storage in the \pay-
as-you-use" cloud computing paradigm, and design a cloud storage service with the
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eciency consideration of both data repair and data retrieval. By utilizing a near-
optimal erasure codes, specically LT codes, our designed storage service has faster
decoding during data retrieval than existing solutions. To minimize the data repair
complexity, we employ the exact repair method to eciently recover the exact form
of any corrupted data. Such a design also reduces the data owner's cost during data
repair since no verication tag needs to be generated (old verication tags can be
recovered as data recovery). By enabling public integrity check, our designed LT
codes based secure cloud storage service (LTCS) completely releases the data owner
from the burden of being online. Our contributions are summarized as follows,
1) We are among the rst to explore the problem of secure and reliable cloud storage
with the eciency consideration for both data repair and data retrieval.
2) Our proposed cloud storage service provides a better overall eciency of data
retrieval and repair than existing counterparts. It also greatly reduces cost and
burden of being online for the data owner by enabling public integrity check and
exact repair.
3) The advantages of our proposed service are validated via both numerical analysis
and experimental results.
2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 The System Model
Considering a cloud data storage service which provides both secure data outsourcing
service and ecient data retrieval and repair service, including four dierent entities:
the data owner, the data user, the cloud server, and the third party server. The data
owner outsources the encoded fragments of the le M to n cloud servers denoted
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as storage servers. If the data owner requires to keep the data content condential,
the leM can be rst encrypted before encoding. Outsourced data are attached by
some metadata like verication tags to provide integrity check capability. After the
data outsourcing, a data user can select any k storage servers to retrieve encoded
segments, and recover the le M, which can be further decrypted in case the le
is encrypted. Meanwhile, the third party server periodically checks the integrity of
data stored in cloud servers. Failed cloud servers can be repaired with the help of
other healthy cloud servers.
2.2.2 The Threat Model
The cloud server is considered as \curious-and-vulnerable". Specically, the cloud
server is vulnerable to Byzantine failures and external attacks. While Byzantine
failures may be made by hardware errors or the cloud maintenance personnel's
misbehaviors, external attacks could be ranging from natural disasters, like re and
earthquake, to adversaries' malicious hacking. After the adversary gains the control
of the cloud server, it may launch the pollution attack or the replay attack which
aims to break the linear independence among encoded data, by replacing the data
stored in corrupted cloud server with old encoded data. If the cloud server is not
corrupted, it correctly follows the designated protocol specication, but it will try to
infer and analyze data in its storage and interactions during the protocol execution
so as to learn additional information. This represents a threat to the privacy of
cloud users' data stored on the server.
2.2.3 Design Goals
To provide secure and reliable cloud data storage services, our design should simul-
taneously achieve performance guarantees during data retrieval and repair.
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 Availability and Reliability: By accessing any k-combination of n storage
servers, the data user could successfully retrieve encoded data and recover all
the original data. The data retrieval service remains functional when up to
n   k storage servers are corrupted in one round, and corrupted servers can
be repaired from other healthy servers.
 Security: The designed storage service protects the data condentiality and
periodically checks the integrity of data in cloud servers to prevent data
dropout or corruption.
 Oine Data Owner: Data owners can go oine immediately after data
outsourcing, which means they are not required to be involved in tasks such
as data integrity check and repair at a later stage.
 Eciency: Above goals should be achieved with low storage, computation
and communication cost for the data owner, data users and cloud servers.
2.2.4 Notations
 M : the outsourced le, consisting of m original packets,M = (M1; : : : ;Mm).
 Sl : the l-th storage server, 1  l  n.
 Cli : the i-th encoded packet stored in the l-th storage server, 1  i  .
 li : the coding vector of the encoded packet Cli.
 'l : the coding tag, used to verify all the coding vectors li in Sl.
 li : the retrieval tag, used to verify Cli in the retrieval and repair.
 lij : the verication tag, used to verify Cli in the integrity check, 1  j  t.
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2.2.5 Preliminary on LT Codes
LT codes [69] has a typical property that the encoding procedure can generate un-
limited number of encoded packets, each of which is generated by conducting bitwise
XOR operation on a subset of original packets. LT codes can recover m original
packets from any m + O(
p
m ln2(m=)) coded packets with probability 1  . The
decoding procedure is performed by the ecient Belief Propagation decoder [70]
with complexity O(m ln(m=)). Code degree d is dened as the number of original
packets that are combined into one coded packet. In LT codes, the distribution of
code degree is dened by Ideal Soliton distribution or Robust Soliton distribution.
The Ideal Soliton distribution is (i), i.e., Pfd = ig, where Pmi=1 (i) = 1 and
(i) = Pfd = ig =
8><>: 1=m if i = 11=i(i  1) if i = 2; : : : ;m:
Robust Soliton distribution is (i), where (i) = ((i)+(i))= and  =
Pm
i=1 (i)+
(i). Let R = c  ln(m=)pm, and dene (i) as follows,
(i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
R=im if i = 1; : : : ;m=R  1
R ln(R=)=m if i = m=R
0 if i = m=R + 1; : : : ;m:
2.3 LTCS: Design Rationale
2.3.1 Enabling Reliability and Availability
To ensure the data reliability in distributed storage systems, various data redun-
dancy techniques can be employed, such as replication, erasure codes, and network
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Figure 2.1: Distributed storage systems based on replication.
coding. Replication as shown in Fig. 2.1 is the most straightforward way of adding
data redundancy where each of n storage servers stores a complete copy of the orig-
inal data. Data users can retrieve the original data by accessing any one of the
storage servers, and the corrupted server can be repaired by simply copying the
entire data from a healthy server.
Given the same level of redundancy, the optimal erasure codes based distributed
storage system as shown in Fig. 2.2 is more reliable by many orders of magnitude
than the replication-based system [116]. Data users can recover the entirem original
packets by retrieving the same number of encoded packets from any k-combination of
n servers, and therefore every server only needs to store m=k encoded packets which
is regarded as the property of optimal redundancy-reliability tradeo. However, its
quadratic decoding complexity makes it very inecient for data users to recover
data during data retrieval. Moreover, the communication cost to repair a failed
storage server is equal to the size of the entire original data in the optimal erasure
codes-based distributed storage system [43, 44]. For example, as a typical optimal
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Figure 2.2: Distributed storage systems based on optimal erasure codes.
erasure codes, Reed-Solomon codes [79] usually need to reconstruct all the original
packets in order to generate a fragment of encoded packets. In other words, one has
to retrieve m encoded packets in order to generate only m=k encoded packets for
the corrupted server.
Network coding-based storage codes [43, 44, 78, 121] as shown in Fig. 2.3 reduce
the repair communication cost to the information theoretic minimum by combining
encoded packets in the healthy servers during the repair procedure, where only
m=k recoded packets are needed to generate the corrupted m=k encoded packets.
Each server needs to store 2m=(k+1) encoded packets, which is more than optimal
erasure codes, to guarantee that data users can retrieve m linearly independent
encoded packets from any k-combination of n servers. Besides, the network coding-
based storage codes have the similar inecient decoding problem as optimal erasure
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Figure 2.3: Distributed storage systems based on network coding.
codes due to the utilization of Gaussian elimination decoder.
To meet the ecient decoding requirement in the cloud data storage scenario
where the data owner outsources huge amount of data for sharing with data users,
our design is based on the near-optimal erasure codes, specically LT codes, to
store low-complexity encoded packets over n distributed servers. The fast Belief
Propagation decoding for LT codes can be used during data retrieval in our LT
codes based secure cloud storage service (LTCS). Data users can eciently recover
all the m of original packets from any m(1 + ) encoded packets which can be
retrieved from any k-combination of n servers. To achieve so, every server needs to
store at least m(1+")=k encoded packets which is larger than the erasure codes but
smaller than the network coding based storage codes.
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Figure 2.4: Data availabity after functional repair as in LTNC.
2.3.2 Reducing Maintenance Cost
To prevent data dropout or corruption, the integrity of data stored in each server
needs to be periodically checked. In [37], the data owner raises a challenge for
every encoded packet to cloud servers. Taking into consideration the large number
of encoded packets with substantial data redundancy in cloud servers, the cost of
such private integrity check is somehow burdensome in terms of both computation
and communication for data owners. LTCS utilizes the public integrity verication
which enables the data owner to delegate the integrity check task to a third party
server. Once there is a server failing to pass the integrity check, the third party
server immediately reports it to the administrator of the cloud server who will then
activate the repair process.
The repair task in our LT codes based storage service is accomplished by gen-
erating the exactly same packets as those previously stored in corrupted storage
servers. Such repair method does not introduce any additional linear dependence
among newly generated packets and those packets stored in healthy storage servers,
and therefore maintains the data availability. Furthermore, we run the decoding
over the encoded packets before outsourcing to guarantee the reliable data retrieval
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and recovery. Unlike the exact repair in our designed service, the functional repair
is the other category of data repair, where the repair procedure generates correct
encoded packets, but not the exactly same packets as those corrupted. Attempts to
apply functional repair in the LT codes based distributed storage should rst solve
how to recode packets, because the random linear recoding in the functional repair
of network coding-based storage codes cannot satisfy the degree distribution in LT
codes. It seems that this problem can be solved by utilizing the recently proposed
LT network codes (LTNC) which provides ecient decoding at the cost of slightly
more communication in the single-source broadcasting scenario [33]. However, af-
ter several rounds of repair with same recoding operations regulated in LT network
codes, data users experience decoding failure with high probability, as illustrated
in Fig. 2.4, where data availability is the probability that data users could recover
original data from any k-combination of n storage servers. The major reason is
that recoding operations with the degree restriction in LT network codes introduce
inneglectable linear dependence among recoded packets and existing packets in LT
codes based storage service. Therefore, the functional repair is not suitable for LT
codes-based storage service.
2.3.3 Oine Data Owner
In the repair procedure, network coding-based storage systems with functional repair
generate new encoded packets to substitute corrupted data in the failed server. The
data owner needs to stay online for generating necessary tags for these new pack-
ets [37]. In LTCS, all newly generated packets for the corrupted storage server in
the repair procedure are exactly the same as old ones previously stored in the server,
which means their corresponding metadata are also same. Like the distributed stor-
age of data packets, these metadata can be stored in multiple servers and recovered
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in case of repairing corrupted servers. The replication or erasure codes (like Reed-
Solomon codes) can be adopted to reliably backup these metadata. Hence, without
the burden of generating tags and checking integrity, the data owner can stay oine
immediately after outsourcing the data which makes LTCS more practical to be
deployed in the cloud paradigm.
2.4 LTCS: The Proposed Secure and Reliable Cloud
Storage Service
In this section, we present the LT codes-based secure and reliable cloud storage
service (LTCS), where n storage servers fSlg1ln are utilized to provide the data
storage service for data owner and data users. Our data integrity technique is
partially adapted from the BLS signature in POR [87].
2.4.1 Setup
Let e : G G ! GT be a bilinear map, where g is the generator of G, with a BLS
hash function H : f0; 1g ! G. The data owner generates a random number   Zp
and s random numbers u1; : : : ; us  G. The secret key sk is fg, and the public
key is pk = fu1; : : : ; us; vg, where v  g.
2.4.2 Data Outsourcing
The data outsourcing is to pre-process data and distribute them to multiple cloud
servers. The le M is rst equally split into m original packets, M1; : : : ;Mm, with
the same size of jMj
m
bits. Following the Robust Soliton degree distribution in LT
codes, m original packets are combined by exclusive-or (XOR) operations to gen-
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erate n encoded packets, where  is the number of packets outsourced to each
storage server and set to m=k  (1+ "). For protecting data condentiality, sensitive
data could be encrypted before the encoding process. Existing data access control
mechanisms [129] can be employed to prevent the cloud server from prying into
outsourced data.
According to LT codes, all the m original packets can be recovered from any
m(1 + ") of encoded packets with probability 1    by on average O(m  ln(m=))
packet operations. However, the availability requirement species that data recov-
ery should be always successful by accessing any k of healthy storage servers. To
achieve this goal, the data owner checks the decodability of these encoded pack-
ets before outsourcing by executing the decoding algorithm. Specically, all the
n encoded packets are divided into n groups, each of which consists of  pack-
ets, ffClig1ig1ln. The Belief Propagation decoding algorithm is then run on
every k-combination of n groups. If the decoding fails in any combination, the
data owner re-generates encoded packets and re-checks the decodability until every
k-combination can recover all the m original packets. Once the encoding cong-
uration successfully passes the decodability detection, it can be reused for all the
storage services that species the same n and k.
For each encoded packet Cli, 1  l  n, 1  i  , three kinds of auxiliary
data are attached, i.e., the coding vector, the retrieval tag, and verication tags.
The coding vector li is a m-bit vector, where each bit represents whether the
corresponding original packet is combined into Cli or not. The retrieval tag li,
computed by Eq. 2.1, is to verify the encoded packet Cli in data retrieval, and also
in data repair if necessary.
li  (H(ljjijjCli)) 2 G (2.1)
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To generate the verication tag for the purpose of integrity check, each encoded
packet Cli is split into t segments, fCli1; : : : ; Clitg. Each segment Clij includes s
symbols in Zp : fClij1; : : : ; Clijsg. For each segment Clij, we generate a verication
tag lij, 1  j  t, in Eq. 2.2.
lij  (H(ljjijjj) 
sY
`=1
u
Clij`
` )
 2 G (2.2)
These data are outsourced to the l-th storage server in the form of
fl; fi; Cli;li; li; flijg1jtg1i; 'lg, where 'l is the coding tag to validate all the
previously coding vectors. The computation of 'l is shown in Eq. 2.3.
'l  (H(ljjl1jj : : : jjl)) 2 G (2.3)
2.4.3 Data Retrieval
Data users can recover original data by accessing any k of n cloud servers in the
data retrieval. The data user rst retrieves all the coding vectors and the coding
tags stored in the selected k cloud servers, and performs the verication in Eq. 2.4.
If the verication operation on any coding tag fails, the data user sends reports to
the third party server and accesses one substitutive storage server.
e('l; g)
?
= e(H(ljjl1jj : : : jjl); v) (2.4)
Once all the coding tags from k storage servers pass the validation, the data user
partially executes the Belief Propagation decoding algorithm only with coding vec-
tors, and records ids of coding vectors that are useful for the decoding. Meanwhile,
the data user retrieves those corresponding useful encoded packets and their re-
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trieval tags from corresponding storage servers, and veries the integrity of encoded
packets as shown in Eq. 2.5.
e(li; g)
?
= e(H(ljjijjCli); v) (2.5)
All the original packets in M can be recovered by performing the same XOR
operations on encoded packets as those on coding vectors. Finally, the data user
can decrypt the M and get the plaintext data if the le is encrypted before encod-
ing. Note that if there exist some verication tags that fail in the integrity check
procedure, the data user also reports them to the third party server and retrieves
data from one substitutive storage server. When the third party server receives any
failure reports from data users about either coding tags or verication tags, it will
immediately challenge the corresponding server (details on challenge will be given
in the following section).
2.4.4 Integrity Check
To monitor the integrity of data stored in the storage servers, the third party server
periodically performs the integrity check over every storage server. The third party
server rst randomly picks +t numbers, a1; : : : ; a; b1; : : : ; bt  Zp, and then sends
them to every storage server. The l-th storage server will compute s integrated
symbols fl`g1`s and one integrated tag &l in Eq. 2.6. Note that ai corresponds
to the i-th encoded packet in every storage server, and bj corresponds to the j-th
segment in each encoded packet.
l` =
X
i=1
tX
j=1
aibjClij`; &l =
Y
i=1
tY
j=1

aibj
lij (2.6)
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Figure 2.5: LT codes-based cloud storage service (LTCS).
The third party server veries these received integrated symbols fl`g1`s and
the integrated verication tag &l, as shown in Eq. 2.7.
e(&l; g)
?
= e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
H(ljjijjj)aibj 
sY
`=1
ul`` ; v) (2.7)
If the verication fails, the third party server reports it to the data center, and the
administrator of the storage server will reset the server software and start the data
repair procedure.
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2.4.5 Data Repair
It is commonly believed that all existing coding constructions must access the orig-
inal data to generate coded packets, which means the communication cost of data
repair for erasure codes is equal to the size of the entire original data [43]. A
straightforward data repair method is therefore to recover all the original data pack-
ets whenever a storage server is corrupted. But such method will introduce much
cost of both computation and communication. In LTCS as illustrated in Fig. 2.5,
one repair server Sn+1 is deployed to eciently repair corrupted storage servers. Al-
though other storage services based on optimal erasure codes or network coding can
also integrate the repair server, they still introduce more computational cost during
data retrieval (and storage cost for network coding-based service) than LTCS, which
will be validated in section 2.6.
To accommodate the repair server, the data owner outsources all the original
packets to the repair server Sn+1 during data outsourcing. Each original packet is
also attached by the verication tag which is generated in the same way as shown
in Eq. 2.2. Besides, all the auxiliary data of storage servers are stored in the repair
server as a backup. Similarly with the distributed data storage, the metadata in-
cluding verication tags for original packets need to be reliably stored in n storage
servers. Compared with the large size of encoded data, auxiliary data are quite small
such that we can employ the simple replication or erasure codes to add redundancy.
To deal with the failure on the l-th storage server, the repair server uses all the
corresponding coding vectors flig1i to generate encoded packets fClig1i.
Specically, Cli is generated by the XOR combination of jlij original packets, as
illustrated in Eq. 2.8, where jli1; : : : ; jlijlij  f1; : : : ;mg correspond to the nonzero
bits in the coding vector li. The repair server sends to Sl all the encoded packets
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Table 2.1: Performance complexity analysis of storage services based on dierent
redundancy techniques.
Network Coding Reed-Solomon LTCS
Server storage O((2n=(k + 1))  jMj) O((1 + n=k)  jMj) O((1 + n(1 + ")=k)  jMj)
Encoding comp. O(2nm2=(k + 1)) O(nm2=k) O((nm(1 + ") lnm)=k)
Retrieval comm. O(jMj) O(jMj) O(jMj)
Retrieval comp. O(m2) O(m2) O(m lnm)
Repair comm. O(2T=(k + 1)  jMj) O(T (1=k + 1=n)  jMj) O(T ((1 + ")=k + 1=n)  jMj)
with their tags in the form of fl; fi; Cli;li; li; flijg1jtg1i; 'lg.
Cli =Mjli1  : : :Mjlijlij (2.8)
The repaired server Sl authenticates received encoded packets fClig1i and aux-
iliary tags as in the data retrieval and integrity check. If the authentication fails,
the repair server itself may be corrupted and need repair.
The third party server also challenges the repair server Sn+1 to check the in-
tegrity of original packets. Since there are m packets stored in Sn+1, instead of 
in storage servers, the third party server should generate m + t random numbers,
a1; : : : ; am; b1; : : : ; bt  Zp. The integrated symbols f(n+1)`g1`s are then gen-
erated from the m original packets, (n+1)` =
mP
i=1
tP
j=1
aibjC(n+1)ij`, where C(n+1)i =
Mi. There are similar changes in the generation of the integrated verication tag,
&n+1 =
mQ
i=1
tQ
j=1

aibj
(n+1)ij . The repair server is less likely to be corrupted than storage
servers, since it does not participate in the data retrieval service for data users. Even
when the repair server is found to be corrupted and needs repair, all the original
packets and auxiliary data can be recovered by performing data retrieval from any
d of healthy storage servers. Therefore, there is no single point of failure.
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2.5 Security Analysis
2.5.1 Protection of Data Condentiality and Integrity
For protecting data condentiality, existing encryption techniques or data access
control schemes [129] can be utilized before the encoding process, which prevent the
cloud server from prying into outsourced data. With respect to the data integrity,
LTCS utilizes various cryptographic tags to resist the pollution attack during the
data repair and retrieval procedures. LTCS is also secure against the replay attack
which is presented in the network coding-based distributed storage system [37].
To lunch the replay attack, the adversary rst corrupts some storage servers and
backups encoded packets stored in these servers. After several rounds of data repair,
the adversary corrupts the same storage servers as before, and then substitutes new
encoded packets with specic old packets. Since the verication tag only binds the
storage server id and the packet id, not the freshness of the packet, the substituted
old packets could pass the integrity verication. As a result, such substitution
makes encoded packets stored in specic k-combinations of n storage servers linearly
dependable, and the data recovery would fail when all other n   k storage servers
are corrupted. Actually, if the data repair mechanism is designed to generate new
packets which are dierent from the old packets stored in the same storage server,
any coding-based distributed storage system is somehow vulnerable to such kind
of attack. In other words, the functional repair itself has the possibility to break
the decodability. By contrast, LTCS employs the exact repair method where the
newly generated packets are the same as those previously stored packets. The replay
attack becomes invalid since there is no dierence between old and new packets in the
same storage server. Furthermore, LTCS examines the data decodability from any
k-combination of storage servers before outsourcing, which guarantees that original
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data could be recovered even when the adversary corrupts both the repair server
and at most n  k storage servers in one round.
2.5.2 Verication Correctness in Integrity Check
The verication correctness in Eq. 2.7 is proved in Eq. 2.9.
e(&l; g) = e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1

aibj
lij ; g)
= e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
(H(ljjijjj)aibj 
sY
`=1
u
aibjClij`
` ); g)

= e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
H(ljjijjj)aibj 
sY
`=1
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
u
aibjClij`
` ; v)
= e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
H(ljjijjj)aibj 
sY
`=1
u
P
i=1
tP
j=1
aibjClij`
` ; v)
= e(
Y
i=1
tY
j=1
H(ljjijjj)aibj 
sY
`=1
ul`` ; v): (2.9)
2.6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of storage services based on dier-
ent redundancy techniques by both theoretical complexity analysis and experimental
evaluation. We set the same desired reliability level as network coding-based dis-
tributed storage system RDC-NC [37], where n = 12, k = 3. Other parameters
are set from the consideration of specic properties of network coding (NC), Reed-
Solomon codes (RS), and LT codes. For LTCS, m = 3072;  = m(1 + ")=k; ds =
1; dr = k;  = ;  = 1; c = 0:1, where "  O(ln2(m=)=
p
m) is the LT overhead
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factor. ds and dr represent the number of cloud servers participating in the repair
of corrupted storage server and corrupted repair server, respectively.  represents
the number of packets retrieved from each participating server during repair. For
Reed-Solomon codes based storage system, m = 6 or 12;  = m=k; d = k;  = ; for
network coding based storage system, m = 6 or 12;  = 2m=(k+1); d = k;  = =d.
The whole experiment system is implemented by C language on a Linux Server
with Intel Xeon Processor 2:93GHz. Besides, the performance of network coding
and Reed-Solomon codes is optimized by employing table lookup in the multiplica-
tion and division over GF (28), and we evaluate their performance with or without
repair server (rs), respectively. The performance complexity comparison among stor-
age services based on dierent redundancy techniques with repair server is shown
in Tab. 2.1, where T is the number of corrupted storage servers in one round,
0  T  n  k.
2.6.1 Outsourcing
As described in section 2.4.2, the data owner detects the decodability in the en-
coding procedure to guarantee data availability. To check all k-combinations of n
groups, the data owner has to execute (nk) times of the Belief Propagation decoding
algorithm. For the eciency purpose, this decoding process can be partially exe-
cuted where only coding vectors follow the decoding steps and data packets are not
involved. If there exists a combination that cannot recover all the original pack-
ets, the data owner will re-generate n coding vectors according to LT codes and
re-detect them, where  is equal to m(1 + ")=k. Once all the (nk) combinations
successfully pass the decodability detection, corresponding coding vectors can be
reused for all the storage services that species the same n and k. As illustrated in
Fig. 2.6(a), the larger " makes the decodability detection more costly because of the
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Figure 2.6: Outsourcing performance with dierent ". n = 12, k = 3, m = 3072.
linear relation between " and , namely the number of coding vectors in each group.
Considering that the larger " leads to more storage cost and repair communication
cost, the following evaluations are conducted by setting " to the smallest one as
0:1904, which corresponds to  = 1219.
Once one set of n coding vectors pass the decodability detection, encoding op-
erations are performed on real data packets via the XOR combination. Although
the number of encoded packets in LTCS, n, is several hundreds times larger than
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in other storage service based on network coding or Reed-Solomon codes, the com-
putational cost of encoding in LTCS is much less than the later, as illustrated in
Fig. 2.7 (a). The main reason for such big advantage is that the average degree
of encoded packets is O(ln(m=)) and O(m) in two services, respectively. Further-
more, the combination for encoding is the ecient XOR in LTCS while the linear
combination in network coding or Reed-Solomon codes involves the multiplication
operations with coecients. The total number of encoded packets in Reed-Solomon
codes-based service is less than network coding-based one so the encoding procedure
introduces dierent computational cost in two services.
As for the data storage in LTCS, every storage server stores  encoded packets,
each of which has the size of jMj=m. And the repair server stores all the m original
packets with the same size. The total data storage in cloud servers is the sum of
all encoded packets in n storage servers and all original packets in the repair server,
which is O(n  jMj=m + jMj), i.e., O([1 + n(1 + ")=k]  jMj). Since LT codes is
a near-optimal erasure codes in terms of redundancy-reliability tradeo, the data
storage cost in LTCS is larger than Reed-Solomon codes-based storage service which
introduces theoretical minimum storage cost as 4jMj in our evaluation setting. By
contrast, the total data storage in existing network coding-based storage service is
O(jMj[2n=(k+1)]) as illustrated in Fig. 2.6(b). If we integrate the repair server into
this service, the storage cost will be O(jMj[1 + 2n=(k + 1)]) which is much larger
than LTCS.
2.6.2 Data Retrieval
The availability in data retrieval is guaranteed by the decodability detection before
data outsourcing and the exact repair of corrupted data. Recall that the data
user rst retrieves k, i.e. m(1 + "), of coding vectors from k storage servers, and
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Figure 2.7: Encoding and decoding time for dierent size of le. n=12, k=3.
then only retrieve m of encoded packets that are useful for decoding. Therefore,
the communication cost during data retrieval in LTCS is the same O(jMj) as the
network coding-based storage system where any m of encoded packets are linearly
independent with high probability.
The computational complexity of Belief Propagation decoding in LTCS is O(m 
ln(m=)) for the data user, where  is set to 1. By contrast, the other storage
services based on network coding or Reed-Solomon codes usually use the costly
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decoding algorithms with higher computational complexity, O(m2). Although the
total number of original packets, m, may be smaller in the other two storage services
than in LTCS, the decoding process for the data user in LTCS performs at least
two times faster than in the other two storage services, as illustrated in 2.7(b).
This ecient decoding process demonstrates that LTCS is more appropriate than
other redundancy-based storage services in the cloud storage paradigm, where data
retrieval is a routine task for data users.
2.6.3 Integrity Check
To check the integrity of data stored in a storage server, the third party server needs
to perform one integrated challenge in LTCS, which means only two bilinear maps
in Eq. 2.7 are executed in order to check  encoded packets. Network coding-based
service has to perform  times of challenges for each storage server where 2 bilinear
maps are executed to check  of encoded packets. Similarly, the communication
cost between the third party server and each storage server during one round of
Integrity Check in network coding-based service is almost  times more than that
in LTCS.
2.6.4 Data Repair
When the repair server is corrupted, LTCS rst retrieve  encoded packets from
each of dr healthy storage servers to recover all the original packets. In such case,
the communication complexity from dr healthy storage servers to the repair server is
O(dr  jMj=m), i.e., O((1+")jMj), where dr = k,  = . If the repair server is not
corrupted or has been repaired, the data repair of storage servers in LTCS is simply
accomplished by the repair server generating  encoded packets for each corrupted
storage server, where ds = 1,  = . Assume the number of corrupted storage
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servers in one round is T , 0  T  n  k. The repair communication complexity in
such scenario is O(T  jMj=m), i.e., O(T (1 + ")=k  jMj), where jMj=m is the size
of each encoded packet.
Assume the corruption probability of the repair server is the same as storage
servers, i.e., T=n. The total repair communication complexity is then calculated as
O(T (1+ ")=k  jMj+T=n  jMj), i.e., O(T ((1+ ")=k+1=n)  jMj). As illustrated in
Fig. 2.8, to repair dierent number of corrupted storage servers T , the communica-
tion cost in LTCS is only 15 percent more than Reed-Solomon codes-based service
integrated with repair server, but smaller than that in network coding-based service.
2.7 Related work
2.7.1 Network Coding-based Distributed Storage
As a new data transmitting technique, network coding is dierent with traditional
store-and-forward methods. Instead of simply forwarding previously received pack-
ets, network coding allows intermediate nodes to recode received packets before
34
forwarding. It has been proved that random linear network coding over a su-
ciently large nite eld can achieve the multicast capacity [53, 82]. Since the data
repair problem in the distributed storage is claimed to be mapped to a multicasting
problem on the information ow graph [43], many network coding-based storage
codes [42{44, 46, 66, 78, 90, 101, 121{125] have been proposed to take advantage of
this property of capacity achievability. By recoding encoded packets in healthy
servers during the repair procedure, the repair communication cost is reduced to
the information theoretical minimum. The achievable region of functional repair
is characterized in [37], but a large part of the achievable region of exact repair
remains open [44]. Furthermore, since network coding utilizes Gaussian elimination
decoding algorithm, the data retrieval is more expensive than erasure codes-based
system [37]. Therefore, these designs are only suitable in \read-rarely" storage sce-
narios, and cannot be eciently deployed in the cloud storage system where data
retrieval is a routine operation.
2.7.2 Remote Data Integrity Check
The remote data integrity check problem has been explored in many works [12,
13, 25, 26, 34, 41, 47, 57, 71, 74, 85, 89, 105, 107, 109{113]. However, existing works do
not have an ecient solution for the data repair problem or pay no attention to it.
Portions of the work studied in this chapter were presented as extended abstract at
the 31th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'12) [32].
Juels et al. [57] described a formal proof of retrievability (POR) model for en-
suring the remote data integrity. Their scheme combines spot-checking and error-
correcting code to ensure both possession and retrievability of les on archive service
systems. Shacham et al. [87] built on this model and constructed a random linear
function based homomorphic authenticator which enables unlimited number of chal-
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lenges and requires less communication overhead due to its usage of relatively small
size of BLS signature. Bowers et al. [26] proposed an improved framework for POR
protocols that generalizes both Juels and Shachams work. Later in their subsequent
work, Bowers et al. [25] extended POR model to distributed systems. However,
all these schemes are focusing on static data. The eectiveness of their schemes
rests primarily on the preprocessing steps that the user conducts before outsourc-
ing the data le. Recently, Dodis et al. [45] gave theoretical studies on generalized
framework for dierent variants of existing POR work.
Ateniese et al. [12] dened the provable data possession (PDP) model for ensuring
possession of le on untrusted storages. Their scheme utilized public key based
homomorphic tags for auditing the data le. In their subsequent work, Ateniese et
al. [13] described a PDP scheme that uses only symmetric key based cryptography.
This method introduces lower overhead than their previous scheme and allows for
block updates, deletions and appends to the stored le. However, their scheme
focuses on single server scenario and does not provide data availability guarantee
against server failures, leaving both the distributed scenario and data error recovery
issue unexplored. Wang et al. [112] proposed to combine BLS based homomorphic
authenticator with Merkle Hash Tree to support fully data dynamics, while Erway
et al. [47] developed a skip list based scheme to enable provable data possession
with fully dynamics support. The incremental cryptography work done by Bellare
et al. [19] also provides a set of cryptographic building blocks such as hash, MAC,
and signature functions that may be employed for storage integrity verication while
supporting dynamic operations on data. However, this branch of work falls into the
traditional data integrity protection mechanism, where local copy of data has to be
maintained for the verication. It is not yet clear how the work can be adapted to
cloud storage scenario where users no longer have the data at local sites but still
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need to ensure the storage correctness eciently in the cloud.
In other related work, Curtmola et al. [41] aimed to ensure data possession
of multiple replicas across the distributed storage system. They extended the PDP
scheme to cover multiple replicas without encoding each replica separately, providing
guarantee that multiple copies of data are actually maintained. Lillibridge et al. [68]
presented a P2P backup scheme which can detect data loss from free-riding peers,
but does not ensure all data is unchanged. Filho et al. [49] proposed to verify data
integrity using RSA-based hash to demonstrate uncheatable data possession in peer-
to- peer le sharing networks. However, their proposal requires exponentiation over
the entire data le, which is clearly impractical for the server whenever the le is
large. Shah et al. [88, 89] proposed allowing a TPA to keep online storage honest
by rst encrypting the data then sending a number of pre-computed symmetric-
keyed hashes over the encrypted data to the auditor. However, their scheme only
works for encrypted les, and auditors must maintain long-term state. Schwarz et
al. [85] proposed to ensure static le integrity across multiple distributed servers,
using erasure-coding and block-level le integrity checks. Very recently, Wang et
al. [107] gave a study on many existing solutions on remote data integrity checking,
and discussed their pros and cons under dierent design scenarios of secure cloud
storage services.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, for the rst time, we explore the problem of secure and reliable cloud
storage with the eciency consideration of both data repair and data retrieval, and
design a LT codes-based cloud storage service (LTCS). To enable ecient decoding
for data users in the data retrieval procedure, we adopt a low complexity LT codes
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for adding data redundancy in distributed cloud servers. Our proposed LTCS pro-
vides ecient data retrieval for data users by utilizing the fast Belief Propagation
decoding algorithm, and releases the data owner from the burden of being online by
enabling public data integrity check and employing exact repair. The performance
analysis and experimental results show that LTCS has a comparable storage and
communication cost, but a much faster data retrieval than the erasure codes-based
solutions. It introduces less storage cost, much faster data retrieval, and comparable
communication cost comparing to network coding-based storage services.
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Chapter 3
Privacy-Preserving
Multi-Keyword Ranked Search
3.1 Introduction
Cloud computing is the long dreamed vision of computing as a utility, where cloud
customers can remotely store their data into the cloud so as to enjoy the on-demand
high quality applications and services from a shared pool of congurable computing
resources [31, 32, 103]. Its great exibility and economic savings are motivating
both individuals and enterprises to outsource their local complex data management
system into the cloud. To protect data privacy and combat unsolicited accesses in
the cloud and beyond, sensitive data, e.g., emails, personal health records, photo
albums, tax documents, nancial transactions, etc., may have to be encrypted by
data owners before outsourcing to the commercial public cloud [58]; this, however,
obsoletes the traditional data utilization service based on plaintext keyword search.
The trivial solution of downloading all the data and decrypting locally is clearly
impractical, due to the huge amount of bandwidth cost in cloud scale systems.
Moreover, aside from eliminating the local storage management, storing data into
the cloud serves no purpose unless they can be easily searched and utilized. Thus,
exploring privacy-preserving and eective search service over encrypted cloud data is
of paramount importance. Considering the potentially large number of on-demand
data users and huge amount of outsourced data documents in the cloud, this problem
is particularly challenging as it is extremely dicult to meet also the requirements
of performance, system usability and scalability.
On the one hand, to meet the eective data retrieval need, the large amount
of documents demand the cloud server to perform result relevance ranking, instead
of returning undierentiated results. Such ranked search system enables data users
to nd the most relevant information quickly, rather than burdensomely sorting
through every match in the content collection [96]. Ranked search can also ele-
gantly eliminate unnecessary network trac by sending back only the most relevant
data, which is highly desirable in the \pay-as-you-use" cloud paradigm. For privacy
protection, such ranking operation, however, should not leak any keyword related
information. On the other hand, to improve the search result accuracy as well as to
enhance the user searching experience, it is also necessary for such ranking system
to support multiple keywords search, as single keyword search often yields far too
coarse results. As a common practice indicated by today's web search engines (e.g.,
Google search), data users may tend to provide a set of keywords instead of only one
as the indicator of their search interest to retrieve the most relevant data. And each
keyword in the search request is able to help narrow down the search result further.
\Coordinate matching" [119], i.e., as many matches as possible, is an ecient sim-
ilarity measure among such multi-keyword semantics to rene the result relevance,
and has been widely used in the plaintext information retrieval (IR) community.
However, how to apply it in the encrypted cloud data search system remains a very
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challenging task because of inherent security and privacy obstacles, including vari-
ous strict requirements like the data privacy, the index privacy, the keyword privacy,
and many others (see section 3.3.2).
In the literature, searchable encryption [7,18,22,23,35,40,51,65,86,98] is a helpful
technique that treats encrypted data as documents and allows a user to securely
search through a single keyword and retrieve documents of interest. However, direct
application of these approaches to the secure large scale cloud data utilization system
would not be necessarily suitable, as they are developed as crypto primitives and
cannot accommodate such high service-level requirements like system usability, user
searching experience, and easy information discovery. Although some recent designs
have been proposed to support Boolean keyword search [16, 24, 29, 52, 55, 59, 63, 67,
93] as an attempt to enrich the search exibility, they are still not adequate to
provide users with acceptable result ranking functionality (see section 3.7). Our
early works [104,106] have been aware of this problem, and provide solutions to the
secure ranked search over encrypted data problem but only for queries consisting
of a single keyword. How to design an ecient encrypted data search mechanism
that supports multi-keyword semantics without privacy breaches still remains a
challenging open problem.
In this chapter, for the rst time, we dene and solve the problem of multi-
keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud data (MRSE) while preserving strict
system-wise privacy in the cloud computing paradigm. Among various multi-keyword
semantics, we choose the ecient similarity measure of \coordinate matching", i.e.,
as many matches as possible, to capture the relevance of data documents to the
search query. Specically, we use \inner product similarity" [119], i.e., the number
of query keywords appearing in a document, to quantitatively evaluate such similar-
ity measure of that document to the search query. During the index construction,
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each document is associated with a binary vector as a subindex where each bit rep-
resents whether corresponding keyword is contained in the document. The search
query is also described as a binary vector where each bit means whether corre-
sponding keyword appears in this search request, so the similarity could be exactly
measured by the inner product of the query vector with the data vector. However,
directly outsourcing the data vector or the query vector will violate the index pri-
vacy or the search privacy. To meet the challenge of supporting such multi-keyword
semantic without privacy breaches, we propose a basic idea for the MRSE using se-
cure inner product computation, which is adapted from a secure k-nearest neighbor
(kNN ) technique [120], and then give two signicantly improved MRSE schemes
in a step-by-step manner to achieve various stringent privacy requirements in two
threat models with increased attack capabilities. Our contributions are summarized
as follows,
1. For the rst time, we explore the problem of multi-keyword ranked search
over encrypted cloud data, and establish a set of strict privacy requirements
for such a secure cloud data utilization system.
2. We propose two MRSE schemes based on the similarity measure of \coordinate
matching" while meeting dierent privacy requirements in two dierent threat
models.
3. We investigate some further enhancements of our ranked search mechanism to
support more search semantics and dynamic data operations.
4. Thorough analysis investigating privacy and eciency guarantees of the pro-
posed schemes is given, and experiments on the real-world dataset further
show the proposed schemes indeed introduce low overhead on computation
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of the search over encrypted cloud data
and communication.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce
the system model, the threat model, our design goals, and the preliminary. Section
3.3 describes the MRSE framework and privacy requirements, followed by section
3.4, which describes the proposed schemes. Section 3.5 discusses supporting more
search semantics and dynamic operation. Section 3.6 presents simulation results.
We discuss related work on both single and Boolean keyword searchable encryption
in Section 3.7, and conclude the chapter in Section 3.8.
3.2 Problem Formulation
3.2.1 System Model
Considering a cloud data hosting service involving three dierent entities, as illus-
trated in Fig. 3.1: the data owner, the data user, and the cloud server. The data
owner has a collection of data documents F to be outsourced to the cloud server
in the encrypted form C. To enable the searching capability over C for eective
data utilization, the data owner, before outsourcing, will rst build an encrypted
searchable index I from F , and then outsource both the index I and the encrypted
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document collection C to the cloud server. To search the document collection for
t given keywords, an authorized user acquires a corresponding trapdoor T through
search control mechanisms, e.g., broadcast encryption [40]. Upon receiving T from a
data user, the cloud server is responsible to search the index I and return the corre-
sponding set of encrypted documents. To improve the document retrieval accuracy,
the search result should be ranked by the cloud server according to some ranking cri-
teria (e.g., coordinate matching, as will be introduced shortly). Moreover, to reduce
the communication cost, the data user may send an optional number k along with
the trapdoor T so that the cloud server only sends back top-k documents that are
most relevant to the search query. Finally, the access control mechanism [129] is em-
ployed to manage decryption capabilities given to users and the the data collection
can be updated in terms of inserting new documents, updating existing documents
and deleting existing documents.
3.2.2 Threat Model
The cloud server is considered as \honest-but-curious" in our model, which is con-
sistent with related works on cloud security [111,129]. Specically, the cloud server
acts in an \honest" fashion and correctly follows the designated protocol speci-
cation. However, it is \curious" to infer and analyze data (including index) in its
storage and message ows received during the protocol so as to learn additional
information. Based on what information the cloud server knows, we consider two
threat models with dierent attack capabilities as follows.
Known Ciphertext Model In this model, the cloud server is supposed to only
know encrypted dataset C and searchable index I, both of which are outsourced
from the data owner.
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Known Background Model In this stronger model, the cloud server is supposed
to possess more knowledge than what can be accessed in the known ciphertext model.
Such information may include the correlation relationship of given search requests
(trapdoors), as well as the dataset related statistical information. As an instance
of possible attacks in this case, the cloud server could use the known trapdoor
information combined with document/keyword frequency [131] to deduce/identify
certain keywords in the query.
3.2.3 Design Goals
To enable ranked search for eective utilization of outsourced cloud data under the
aforementioned model, our system design should simultaneously achieve security
and performance guarantees as follows.
 Multi-keyword Ranked Search: To design search schemes which allow
multi-keyword query and provide result similarity ranking for eective data
retrieval, instead of returning undierentiated results.
 Privacy-Preserving: To prevent the cloud server from learning additional
information from the dataset and the index, and to meet privacy requirements
specied in section 3.3.2.
 Eciency: Above goals on functionality and privacy should be achieved with
low communication and computation overhead.
3.2.4 Notations
 F { the plaintext document collection, denoted as a set of m data documents
F = (F1; F2; : : : ; Fm).
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 C { the encrypted document collection stored in the cloud server, denoted as
C = (C1; C2; : : : ; Cm).
 W { the dictionary, i.e., the keyword set consisting of n keyword, denoted as
W = (W1;W2; : : : ;Wn).
 I { the searchable index associated with C, denoted as (I1; I2; : : : ; Im) where
each subindex Ii is built for Fi.
 fW { the subset of W , representing the keywords in a search request, denoted
as fW = (Wj1 ;Wj2 ; : : : ;Wjt).
 TfW { the trapdoor for the search request fW .
 FfW { the ranked id list of all documents according to their relevance to fW .
3.2.5 Preliminary on Coordinate Matching
As a hybrid of conjunctive search and disjunctive search, \coordinate matching" [119]
is an intermediate similarity measure which uses the number of query keywords ap-
pearing in the document to quantify the relevance of that document to the query.
When users know the exact subset of the dataset to be retrieved, Boolean queries
perform well with the precise search requirement specied by the user. In cloud
computing, however, this is not the practical case, given the huge amount of out-
sourced data. Therefore, it is more exible for users to specify a list of keywords
indicating their interest and retrieve the most relevant documents with a rank order.
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3.3 Framework and Privacy Requirements for MRSE
In this section, we dene the framework of multi-keyword ranked search over en-
crypted cloud data (MRSE) and establish various strict system-wise privacy require-
ments for such a secure cloud data utilization system.
3.3.1 MRSE Framework
For easy presentation, operations on the data documents are not shown in the
framework since the data owner could easily employ the traditional symmetric key
cryptography to encrypt and then outsource data. With focus on the index and
query, the MRSE system consists of four algorithms as follows.
 Setup(1`) Taking a security parameter ` as input, the data owner outputs a
symmetric key as SK.
 BuildIndex(F ; SK) Based on the dataset F , the data owner builds a searchable
index I which is encrypted by the symmetric key SK and then outsourced to
the cloud server. After the index construction, the document collection can be
independently encrypted and outsourced.
 Trapdoor(fW) With t keywords of interest in fW as input, this algorithm gen-
erates a corresponding trapdoor TfW .
 Query(TfW ; k; I) When the cloud server receives a query request as (TfW , k),
it performs the ranked search on the index I with the help of trapdoor TfW ,
and nally returns FfW , the ranked id list of top-k documents sorted by their
similarity with fW .
Neither the search control nor the access control is within the scope of this
dissertation. While the former is to regulate how authorized users acquire trapdoors,
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the later is to manage users' access to outsourced documents.
3.3.2 Privacy Requirements for MRSE
The representative privacy guarantee in the related literature, such as searchable
encryption, is that the server should learn nothing but search results. With this
general privacy description, we explore and establish a set of strict privacy require-
ments specically for the MRSE framework.
As for the data privacy, the data owner can resort to the traditional symmetric
key cryptography to encrypt the data before outsourcing, and successfully prevent
the cloud server from prying into the outsourced data. With respect to the index pri-
vacy, if the cloud server deduces any association between keywords and encrypted
documents from index, it may learn the major subject of a document, even the
content of a short document [131]. Therefore, the searchable index should be con-
structed to prevent the cloud server from performing such kind of association attack.
While data and index privacy guarantees are demanded by default in the related
literature, various search privacy requirements involved in the query procedure are
more complex and dicult to tackle as follows.
Keyword Privacy As users usually prefer to keep their search from being exposed
to others like the cloud server, the most important concern is to hide what they are
searching, i.e., the keywords indicated by the corresponding trapdoor. Although the
trapdoor can be generated in a cryptographic way to protect the query keywords,
the cloud server could do some statistical analysis over the search result to make an
estimate. As a kind of statistical information, document frequency (i.e., the number
of documents containing the keyword) is sucient to identify the keyword with high
probability [130]. When the cloud server knows some background information of the
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dataset, this keyword specic information may be utilized to reverse-engineer the
keyword.
Trapdoor Unlinkability The trapdoor generation function should be a random-
ized one instead of being deterministic. In particular, the cloud server should not be
able to deduce the relationship of any given trapdoors, e.g., to determine whether
the two trapdoors are formed by the same search request. Otherwise, the deter-
ministic trapdoor generation would give the cloud server advantage to accumulate
frequencies of dierent search requests regarding dierent keyword(s), which may
further violate the aforementioned keyword privacy requirement. So the fundamen-
tal protection for trapdoor unlinkability is to introduce sucient nondeterminacy
into the trapdoor generation procedure.
Access Pattern Within the ranked search, the access pattern is the sequence of
search results where every search result is a set of documents with rank order. Specif-
ically, the search result for the query keyword set fW is denoted as FfW , consisting
of the id list of all documents ranked by their relevance to fW . Then the access
pattern is denoted as (FfW1 ;FfW2 ; : : :) which are the results of sequential searches.
Although a few searchable encryption works, e.g., [29] has been proposed to utilize
private information retrieval (PIR) technique [56, 62, 75, 75, 114, 118], to hide the
access pattern, our proposed schemes are not designed to protect the access pattern
for the eciency concerns. This is because any PIR based technique must \touch"
the whole dataset outsourced on the server which is inecient in the large scale
cloud system.
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3.4 Privacy-Preserving and Ecient MRSE
To eciently achieve multi-keyword ranked search, we propose to employ \inner
product similarity" [119] to quantitatively evaluate the ecient similarity measure
\coordinate matching". Specically, Di is a binary data vector for document Fi
where each bit Di[j] 2 f0; 1g represents the existence of the corresponding keyword
Wj in that document, and Q is a binary query vector indicating the keywords of
interest where each bit Q[j] 2 f0; 1g represents the existence of the corresponding
keyword Wj in the query fW . The similarity score of document Fi to query fW is
therefore expressed as the inner product of their binary column vectors, i.e., Di Q.
For the purpose of ranking, the cloud server must be given the capability to compare
the similarity of dierent documents to the query. But, to preserve strict system-
wise privacy, data vector Di, query vector Q and their inner product Di Q should
not be exposed to the cloud server. In this section, we rst propose a basic idea for
the MRSE using secure inner product computation, which is adapted from a secure
k-nearest neighbor (kNN) technique, and then show how to signicantly improve it
to be privacy-preserving against dierent threat models in the MRSE framework in
a step-by-step manner.
3.4.1 Secure Inner Product Computation
3.4.1.1 Secure kNN Computation
In the secure k-nearest neighbor (kNN) scheme [120], Euclidean distance between a
data record pi and a query vector q is used to select k nearest database records. The
secret key is composed of one (d+1)-bit vector as S and two (d+1)(d+1) invertible
matrices as fM1;M2g, where d is the number of elds for each record pi. First, every
data vector pi and query vector q are extended to (d+1)-dimension vectors as ~pi and
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~q, where the (d + 1)-th dimension is set to  0:5jjp2i jj and 1, respectively. Besides,
the query vector ~q is scaled by a random number r > 0 as (rq; r). Then, ~pi is split
into two random vectors as f~pi0; ~pi00g, and ~q is also split into two random vectors as
f~q 0; ~q 00g. Note here that vector S functions as a splitting indicator. Namely, if the
j-th bit of S is 0, ~pi
0[j] and ~pi00[j] are set as the same as ~pi[j], while ~q 0[j] and ~q 00[j]
are set to two random numbers so that their sum is equal to ~q[j]; if the j-th bit of S
is 1, the splitting process is similar except that ~pi and ~q are switched. The split data
vector pair f~pi0; ~pi00g is encrypted as fpia; pibg, where pia =MT1 ~pi0 and pib =MT2 ~pi00;
the split query vector pair f~q 0; ~q 00g is encrypted as fqa; qbg, where qa =M 11 ~q 0 and
qb = M
 1
2 ~q
00. In the query step, the product of data vector pair and query vector
pair, i.e.,  0:5r(jjpijj2   2pi  q), is serving as the indicator of Euclidean distance
(jjpijj2   2pi  q + jjqjj2) to select k nearest neighbors.
Security Analysis in Known Ciphertext Model Similarly with [120], let the
knowledge of the attacker be the encrypted data record and query vector. For any
data record pi, by denition, the attacker knows the encrypted values fpia; pibg.
If the attacker does not know the splitting conguration, he has to model as two
random (d+1)-dimensional vectors. The equations for solving the transformation
matrices areMT1 ~pi
0 = pia andMT2 ~pi
00 = pib, whereM1 andM2 are two (d+1)(d+1)
unknown matrices. There are 2(d+1) unknowns in pia and pib and 2(d+1)
2 unknowns
in M1 and M2. Since there are only 2(d + 1) equations, which are less than the
number of unknowns, the attacker does not have sucient information to solve for
the transformation matrices. Hence, we believe this kNN computation scheme is
secure in the known ciphertext model.
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3.4.1.2 Secure Inner Product Computation
As the MRSE is using the inner product similarity instead of the Euclidean distance,
we need to do some modications on the secure kNN computation scheme to t the
MRSE framework. One way to do that is by eliminating the dimension extension,
the nal result changes to be the inner product as rpi  q.
Eciency Analysis While the encryption of either data record or query vector
involves two multiplications of a d  d matrix and a d-dimension vector with com-
plexity O(d2), the nal inner product computation involves two multiplications of
two d-dimension vectors with complexity O(d).
Security Analysis In the known ciphertext model, the splitting vector S is un-
known, so ~pi
0 and ~pi00 are considered as two random d-dimensional vectors. To solve
the linear equations created by the encryption of data vectors, we have 2dm un-
knowns in m data vectors and 2d2 unknowns in fM1;M2g. Since we have only 2dm
equations, which are less than the number of unknowns, there is no sucient in-
formation to solve either data vectors or fM1;M2g. Similarly, ~q 0 and ~q 00 are also
considered as two random d-dimensional vectors. To solve the linear equations cre-
ated by the encryption of query vectors, we have 2d unknowns in two query vectors
and 2d2 unknowns in fM1;M2g. Since we have only 2d equations here, which are
less than the number of unknowns, there is no sucient information to solve either
query vectors or fM1;M2g. Therefore, we believe that without prior knowledge of
secret key, neither data vector nor query vector, after such a series of processes
like splitting and multiplication, can be recovered by analyzing their corresponding
ciphertexts.
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3.4.2 MRSE I: Privacy-Preserving Scheme in Known Ci-
phertext Model
The adapted secure inner product computation scheme is not good enough for our
MRSE design. The major reason is that the only randomness involved is the scale
factor r in the trapdoor generation, which does not provide sucient nondetermi-
nacy in the overall scheme as required by the trapdoor unlinkability requirement as
well as the keyword privacy requirement. To provide a more advanced design for
the MRSE, we now provide our MRSE I scheme as follows.
3.4.2.1 MRSE I Scheme
In our more advanced design, instead of simply removing the extended dimension
in the query vector as we plan to do at the rst glance, we preserve this dimension
extending operation but assign a new random number t to the extended dimension
in each query vector. Such a newly added randomness is expected to increase the
diculty for the cloud server to learn the relationship among the received trap-
doors. In addition, as mentioned in the keyword privacy requirement, randomness
should also be carefully calibrated in the search result to obfuscate the document
frequency and diminish the chances for re-identication of keywords. Introducing
some randomness in the nal similarity score is an eective way towards what we
expect here. More specically, unlike the randomness involved in the query vector,
we insert a dummy keyword into each data vector and assign a random value to it.
Each individual vector Di is extended to (n+2)-dimension instead of (n+1), where
a random variable "i representing the dummy keyword is stored in the extended
dimension. The whole scheme to achieve ranked search with multiple keywords over
encrypted data is as follows.
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 Setup The data owner randomly generates a (n + 2)-bit vector as S and two
(n + 2)  (n + 2) invertible matrices fM1;M2g. The secret key SK is in the
form of a 3-tuple as fS;M1;M2g.
 BuildIndex(F ; SK) The data owner generates a binary data vector Di for every
document Fi, where each binary bit Di[j] represents whether the correspond-
ing keyword Wj appears in the document Fi. Subsequently, every plaintext
subindex ~Di is generated by applying dimension extending and splitting pro-
cedures on Di. These procedures are similar with those in the secure kNN
computation except that the (n+1)-th entry in ~Di is set to a random number
"i, and the (n+2)-th entry in ~Di is set to 1 during the dimension extending. ~Di
is therefore equal to (Di; "i; 1). Finally, the subindex Ii = fMT1 ~Di0;MT2 ~Di00g
is built for every encrypted document Ci.
 Trapdoor(fW) With t keywords of interest in fW as input, one binary vector Q
is generated where each bit Q[j] indicates whether Wj 2 fW is true or false.
Q is rst extended to n+ 1-dimension which is set to 1, and then scaled by a
random number r 6= 0, and nally extended to a (n + 2)-dimension vector as
~Q where the last dimension is set to another random number t. ~Q is therefore
equal to (rQ; r; t). After applying the same splitting and encrypting processes
as above, the trapdoor TfW is generated as fM 11 ~Q0;M 12 ~Q00g.
 Query(TfW ; k; I) With the trapdoor TfW , the cloud server computes the similar-
ity scores of each document Fi as in equation 3.1. WLOG, we assume r > 0.
After sorting all scores, the cloud server returns the top-k ranked id list FfW .
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With t brought into the query vector and "i brought into each data vector, the
nal similarity scores would be:
Ii  TfW = fMT1 ~Di0;MT2 ~Di00g  fM 11 ~Q0;M 12 ~Q00g
= ~Di
0  ~Q 0 + ~Di00  ~Q 00
= ~Di  ~Q
= (Di; "i; 1)  (rQ; r; t)
= r(Di Q+ "i) + t: (3.1)
Note that in the original case, the nal score is simply rDi Q, which preserves
the scale relationship for two queries on the same keywords. But such an issue is
no longer valid in our improved scheme due to the randomness of both t and "i,
which clearly demonstrates the eectiveness and improved security strength of our
MSRE I mechanism.
3.4.2.2 Analysis
We analyze this MRSE I scheme from three aspects of design goals described in
section 3.2.
Functionality and Eciency Assume the number of query keywords appearing
in a document Fi is xi = Di  Q. From equation 3.1, the nal similarity score
as yi = Ii  TfW = r(xi + "i) + t is a linear function of xi, where the coecient
r is set as a positive random number. However, because the random factor "i is
introduced as a part of the similarity score, the nal search result on the basis of
sorting similarity scores may not be as accurate as that in original scheme. For the
consideration of search accuracy, we can let "i follow a normal distribution N(; 
2),
where the standard deviation  functions as a exible trade-o parameter among
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search accuracy and security. From the consideration of eectiveness,  is expected
to be smaller so as to obtain high precision indicating the good purity of retrieved
documents. To quantitatively evaluate the search accuracy, we set a measure as
precision Pk to capture the fraction of returned top-k documents that are included
in the real top-k list. Detailed accuracy evaluation on the real-world dataset will be
given in section 3.6.
As for the eciency, our inner product based MRSE scheme is an outstanding
approach from the performance perspective. In the steps like BuildIndex or Trapdoor,
the generation procedure of each subindex or trapdoor involves two multiplications
of a (n+2) (n+2) matrix and a (n+2)-dimension vector with complexity O(n2).
In the Query, the nal similarity score is computed through two multiplications of
two (n+ 2)-dimension vectors with complexity O(n).
Privacy As for the data privacy, traditional symmetric key encryption techniques
could be properly utilized here and is not within the scope of this dissertation.
The index privacy is well protected if the secret key SK is kept condential
since such vector encryption method has been proved to be secure in the known
ciphertext model [120]. We add two more dimensions to the vectors compared to
the adapted secure inner product computation described in Section 3.4.1.2. In the
encryption of data vectors, the number of equations as 2(n + 2)m in MT1 ~Di
0 = I 0i
and MT2 ~Di
00 = I 00i is still less than the number of unknowns as the sum of 2(n+2)m
unknowns in m data vectors and 2(n+ 2)2 unknowns in fM1;M2g. As a result, the
attacker cannot solve the equations. Note that the addition of dimensions will only
increase the security of the scheme [120].
With the randomness introduced by the splitting process and the random num-
bers r, and t, our basic scheme can generate two totally dierent trapdoors for the
same query fW . This nondeterministic trapdoor generation can guarantee the trap-
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of nal similarity score with dierent standard deviations,
10k documents, 10 query keywords.
door unlinkability which is an unsolved privacy leakage problem in related symmetric
key based searchable encryption schemes because of the deterministic property of
trapdoor generation [40]. Moreover, with properly selected parameter  for the ran-
dom factor "i, even the nal score results can be obfuscated very well, preventing the
cloud server from learning the relationships of given trapdoors and the correspond-
ing keywords. Note that although  is expected to be small from the eectiveness
point of view, the small one will introduce small obfuscation into the the nal sim-
ilarity scores, which may weaken the protection of keyword privacy and trapdoor
57
unlinkability. As shown in Fig. 3.2, the distribution of the nal similarity scores with
smaller  will enable the cloud server to learn more statistical information about
the original similarity scores, and therefore  should be set large enough from the
consideration of privacy.
3.4.3 MRSE II: Privacy-Preserving Scheme in Known Back-
ground Model
When the cloud server has knowledge of some background information on the out-
sourced dataset, e.g., the correlation relationship of two given trapdoors, certain
keyword privacy may not be guaranteed anymore by the MRSE I scheme. This
is possible in the known background model because the cloud server can use scale
analysis as follows to deduce the keyword specic information, e.g., document fre-
quency, which can be further combined with background information to identify the
keyword in a query at high probability. After presenting how the cloud server uses
scale analysis attack to break the keyword privacy, we propose a more advanced
MRSE scheme to be privacy-preserving in the known background model.
3.4.3.1 Scale Analysis Attack
Given two correlated trapdoors T1 and T2 for query keywords fK1; K2g and fK1; K2; K3g
respectively, there will be two special cases when searching on any three documents
as listed in Tab. 3.1 and Tab. 3.2. In any of these two cases, there exists a system
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Table 3.1: K3 appears in every document
Doc Query for fK1; K2; K3g Query for fK1; K2g
1 x1 = 3; y1 = r(3 + "1) + t x
0
1 = 2; y
0
1 = r
0(2 + "1) + t0
2 x2 = 2; y2 = r(2 + "2) + t x
0
2 = 1; y
0
2 = r
0(1 + "2) + t0
3 x3 = 1; y3 = r(1 + "3) + t x
0
3 = 0; y
0
3 = r
0(0 + "3) + t0
of equations among nal similarity scores yi for T1 and y
0
i for T2 as follows,8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
y1   y2 = r(1 + "1   "2);
y01   y02 = r0(1 + "1   "2);
y2   y3 = r(1 + "2   "3);
y02   y03 = r0(1 + "2   "3);
y1   y3 = r(2 + "1   "3);
y01   y03 = r0(2 + "1   "3):
(3.2)
To this end, although the exact value of xi is encrypted as yi, the cloud server could
deduce that whether all the three documents contain K3 or none of them contain
K3 through checking the following equivalence relationship among all nal similarity
scores in two queries,
y1   y2
y01   y02 =
y2   y3
y02   y03 =
y1   y3
y01   y03 : (3.3)
By extending three documents to the whole dataset, the cloud server could further
deduce two possible values of document frequency of keyword K3. In the known
background model, the server can identify the keyword K3 by referring to the key-
word specic document frequency information about the dataset.
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Table 3.2: K3 does not appear in either document
Doc Query for fK1; K2; K3g Query for fK1; K2g
1 x1 = 2; y1 = r(2 + "1) + t x
0
1 = 2; y
0
1 = r
0(2 + "1) + t0
2 x2 = 1; y2 = r(1 + "2) + t x
0
2 = 1; y
0
2 = r
0(1 + "2) + t0
3 x3 = 0; y3 = r(0 + "3) + t x
0
3 = 0; y
0
3 = r
0(0 + "3) + t0
3.4.3.2 MRSE II Scheme
The privacy leakage shown above is caused by the xed value of random variable "i
in data vector Di. To eliminate such xed property in any specic document, more
dummy keywords instead of only one should be inserted into every data vector Di.
All the vectors are extended to (n+U +1)-dimension instead of (n+2), where U is
the number of dummy keywords inserted. Improved details in the MRSE II scheme
is presented as follows.
 Setup(1n) The data owner randomly generates a (n + U + 1)-bit vector as S
and two (n+ U + 1) (n+ U + 1) invertible matrices fM1;M2g.
 BuildIndex(F ; SK) The (n + j + 1)-th entry in ~Di where j 2 [1; U ] is set to a
random number "(j) during the dimension extending.
 Trapdoor(fW) By randomly selecting V out of U dummy keywords, the corre-
sponding entries in Q are set to 1.
 Query(TfW ; k; I) The nal similarity score computed by cloud server is equal
to r(xi +
P
"
(v)
i ) + ti where the v-th dummy keyword is included in the V
selected ones.
3.4.3.3 Analysis
Assume the probability of two
P
"
(v)
i having the same value should be less than 1=2
!,
it then means there should be at least 2! dierent values of
P
"
(v)
i for each data
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vector. The number of dierent
P
"
(v)
i is not larger than (
U
V ), which is maximized
when U
V
= 2. Besides, considering (UV )  (UV )V = 2V , it is greater than 2! when
U = 2! and V = !. So every data vector should include at least 2! dummy entries,
and every query vector will randomly select half dummy entries. Here ! can be
considered as a system parameter for the tradeo between eciency and privacy.
With properly setting the value of !, the MRSE II scheme is secure against scale
analysis attack, and provides various expected privacy guarantees within the known
ciphertext model or the known background model.
Moreover, every "(j) is assumed to follow the same uniform distribution M(0  
c; 0 + c), where the mean is 0 and the variance as 02 is c2=3. According to the
central limit theorem, the sum of ! independent random variables "(j) follows the
Normal distribution, where the mean is !0 and the variance is !02 = !c2=3. To
make
P
"
(v)
i follow the Normal distribution N(; 
2) as above, the value of 0 is set
as =! and the value of c is set as
q
3
!
 so that !0 =  and !02 = 2. With
such parameter setting, search accuracy is statistically the same as that in MRSE I
scheme.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Supporting More Search Semantics
In the ranking principle \coordinate matching", the presence of keyword in the
document or the query is shown as 1 in the data vector or the query vector. Actually,
there are more factors which could make impact on the search usability. For example,
when one keyword appears in most documents in the dataset, the importance of this
keyword in the query is less than other keywords which appears in less documents.
Similarly, if one document contains a query keyword in multiple locations, the user
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may prefer this to the other document which contains the query keyword in only
one location. To capture these information in the search process, we use the TF
 IDF weighting rule within the vector space model to calculate the similarity,
where TF (or term frequency) is the number of times a given term or keyword
(we will use them interchangeably hereafter) appears within a le (to measure the
importance of the term within the particular le), and IDF (or inverse document
frequency) is obtained by dividing the number of les in the whole collection by
the number of les containing the term (to measure the overall importance of the
term within the whole collection). Among several hundred variations of the TF 
IDF weighting scheme, no single combination of them outperforms any of the others
universally [134]. Thus, without loss of generality, we choose an example formula
that is commonly used and widely seen in the literature (see Chapter 4 in [96]) for
the relevance score calculation,
Score(Fi; Q) =
1
jFij
X
Wj2fW
(1 + ln fi;j)  ln(1 + m
fj
): (3.4)
Here fi;j denotes the TF of keyword Wj in le Fi; fj denotes the number of les
that contain keyword Wj which is called document frequency; m denotes the total
number of les in the collection; and jFij is the Euclidean length of le Fi, obtained
by
s
nP
j=1
(1 + ln fi;j)2, functioning as the normalization factor.
In order to calculate the relevance score as shown in Eq. 3.4 on the server side, we
propose a new search mechanism MRSE I TF as follows which modify related data
structures in the previous scheme MRSE I. As for the dictionary W , the document
frequency fj is attached to every keyword Wj, which will be used in the generation
of query vector. In BuildIndex, for every keyword Wj appearing in the document
Fi, the corresponding entry Di[j] in the data vector Di is changed from a binary
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value 1 to the normalized term frequency, i.e.,
1+ln fi;j
jFij . Similarly, the query vector
Q changes corresponding entries from 1 to ln(1 + m
fj
). Finally, the similarity score
is as follows,
Ii  TfW = r(Di Q+ "i) + t
= r(
X
Wj2Q
1 + ln fi;j
jFij  ln(1 +
m
fj
) + "i) + t
= r(Score(Fi; Q) + "i) + t: (3.5)
Therefore, the similarity of the document and the query in terms of the cosine of
the angle between the document vector and the query vector could be evaluated by
computing the inner product of subindex Ii and trapdoor TfW . Although this similar-
ity measurement introduces more computation cost during the index construction
and trapdoor generation, it captures more related information on the content of
documents and query which returns better results of users' interest. As we will see
in section 3.6, the additional cost of this measurement in BuildIndex and Trapdoor
is relatively small compared to the whole cost. Besides, BuildIndex is a one-time
computation for the whole scheme.
Here, although some entries in Di have been changed from binary value 1 to
normalized term frequency, the scale analysis attack presented in section 3.4.2 still
partially works in the known background model. With similar setting in the previous
section, the rst query contains two keywords as fK1; K2g while the second query
contains three keywords as fK1; K2; K3g. Given three documents as an example, the
rst keyword K1 appears in two documents as F1 and F2, and the second keyword
K2 appears in document F1. Note that there are some dierence between this attack
and previous one. If the third keyword K3 appears in each of these three documents
as shown in Tab. 3.1, such equivalence relationship as shown in in Eq. 3.3 does no
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exist among these documents here. Here we only consider the case that the third
keyword K3 does not appear in any of these three documents. The nal similarity
scores are shown as follows,
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
y1 = r(
1 + ln f1;1
jF1j  ln(1 +
m
f1
) +
1 + ln f1;2
jF1j  ln(1 +
m
f2
) + "1) + t;
y2 = r(
1 + ln f2;1
jF2j  ln(1 +
m
f1
) + "2) + t;
y3 = r"3 + t;
y01 = r0(
1 + ln f1;1
jF1j  ln(1 +
m
f1
) +
1 + ln f1;2
jF1j  ln(1 +
m
f2
) + "1) + t
0;
y02 = r0(
1 + ln f2;1
jF2j  ln(1 +
m
f1
) + "2) + t
0;
y03 = r0"3 + t0:
(3.6)
Recall that the scale analysis attack presented in section 3.4.2, it is caused by
the xed value of random variable "i in each data vector Di which remains same
here. From Eq. 3.6, the cloud server can still deduce the equivalence relationship as
presented in Eq. 3.3. As a result, the document frequency could be exposed to cloud
server and further used to identify this keyword in the known background model.
To this end, we can employ the same solution as presented in MRSE II to build the
new mechanism as MRSE II TF where more dummy keywords instead of only one
are inserted into data vectors.
3.5.2 Supporting Data Dynamics
After the dataset is outsourced to the cloud server, it may be updated in addition to
being retrieved [109]. Along with the updating operation on data documents, sup-
porting the score dynamics in the searchable index is thus of practical importance.
While we consider three dynamic data operations as inserting new documents, modi-
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fying existing documents and deleting existing documents, corresponding operations
on the searchable index includes generating new index, updating existing index and
deleting existing index. Since dynamic data operations also aect the document
frequency of corresponding keywords, we also need to update the dictionary W .
For the operation of inserting new documents in the dataset, there may be some
new keywords in new documents which need to be inserted in the dictionaryW . Re-
member that every subindex in our scheme has xed dimension as same as the num-
ber of keywords in the old dictionary, so the straightforward solution is to retrieve
all the subindexes from the cloud server, and then decrypt, rebuild and encrypt
them before outsourcing to the cloud server. However, this approach introduces
much cost on computation and communication for both sides which is impractical
in the \pay-as-you-use" cloud paradigm. To reduce such great cost, we preserve
some blank entries in the dictionary and set corresponding entries in each data vec-
tor as 0. If the dictionary needs to index new keywords in the case of inserting new
documents, we just replace the blank entries in the dictionary by new keywords,
and generate subindexes for new documents based on the updated dictionary. The
other documents and their subindexes stored on the cloud server are not aected
and therefore remain the same as before. The number of preserved entries functions
as a tradeo parameter to balance the storage cost and the system scalability.
When existing documents are modied, corresponding subindexes are also re-
trieved from the cloud server and then updated in terms of the term frequency
before outsourcing. If new keywords are introduced during the modication op-
eration, we utilize the same method which is proposed in the previous insertion
operation. As a special case of modication, the operation of deleting existing doc-
uments introduce less computation and communication cost since it only requires to
update the document frequency of all the keywords contained by these documents.
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3.6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed
technique on a real-world dataset: the Enron Email Dataset [39]. We randomly
select dierent number of emails to build dataset. The whole experiment system is
implemented by C language on a Linux Server with Intel Xeon Processor 2:93GHz.
The public utility routines by Numerical Recipes are employed to compute the
inverse of matrix. The performance of our technique is evaluated regarding the
eciency of four proposed MRSE schemes, as well as the tradeo between search
precision and privacy.
3.6.1 Precision and Privacy
As presented in Section 3.4, dummy keywords are inserted into each data vector and
some of them are selected in every query. Therefore, similarity scores of documents
will be not exactly accurate. In other words, when the cloud server returns top-k
documents based on similarity scores of data vectors to query vector, some of real
top-k relevant documents for the query may be excluded. This is because either their
original similarity scores are decreased or the similarity scores of some documents
out of the real top-k are increased, both of which are due to the impact of dummy
keywords inserted into data vectors. To evaluate the purity of the k documents
retrieved by user, we dene a measure as precision Pk = k
0=k where k0 is number of
real top-k documents that are returned by the cloud server. Fig. 3.3(a) shows that
the precision in MRSE scheme is evidently aected by the standard deviation  of
the random variable ". From the consideration of eectiveness, standard deviation
 is expected to be smaller so as to obtain high precision indicating the good purity
of retrieved documents.
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Figure 3.3: With dierent choice of standard deviation  for the random variable ",
there exists tradeo between (a) Precision, and (b) Rank Privacy.
However, user's rank privacy may have been partially leaked to the cloud server
as a consequence of small . As described in section 3.3.2, the access pattern is
dened as the sequence of ranked search results. Although search results cannot
be protected (excluding costly PIR technique), we can still hide the rank order of
retrieved documents as much as possible. In order to evaluate this privacy guarantee,
we rst dene the rank perturbation as epi = jri r0ij=k, where ri is the rank number
of document Fi in the retrieved top-k documents and r
0
i is its rank number in the
real ranked documents. The overall rank privacy measure at point k is then dened
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as the average of all the epi for every document i in the retrieved top-k documents,
denoted as ePk =Pepi=k. Fig. 3.3(b) shows the rank privacy at dierent points with
two standard deviations  = 1 and  = 0:5 respectively.
From these two gures, we can see that small  leads to higher precision of
search result but lower rank privacy guarantee, while large  results in higher rank
privacy guarantee but lower precision. In other words, our scheme provides a balance
parameter for data users to satisfy their dierent requirements on precision and rank
privacy.
3.6.2 Eciency
3.6.2.1 Index Construction
To build a searchable subindex Ii for each document Fi in the dataset F , the rst
step is to map the keyword set extracted from the document Fi to a data vector Di,
followed by encrypting every data vector. The time cost of mapping or encrypting
depends directly on the dimensionality of data vector which is determined by the
size of the dictionary, i.e., the number of indexed keywords. And the time cost of
building the whole index is also related to the number of subindex which is equal
to the number of documents in the dataset. Fig. 3.4(a) shows that, given the same
dictionary where jWj = 4000, the time cost of building the whole index is nearly
linear with the size of dataset since the time cost of building each subindex is xed.
Fig. 3.4(b) shows that the number of keywords indexed in the dictionary determines
the time cost of building a subindex. As presented in the section 3.4.1, the major
computation to generate a subindex in MRSE I includes the splitting process and
two multiplications of a (n + 2)  (n + 2) matrix and a (n + 2)-dimension vector
where n = jWj, both of which have direct relationship with the size of dictionary.
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(a) For the dierent size of dataset with the same
dictionary, n = 4000
(b) For the same dataset with dierent size of
dictionary, m = 1000
Figure 3.4: Time cost of building index.
The dimensionality of matrices in MRSE II is (n + U + 1)  (n + U + 1) so that
its index construction time with complexity O(m(n + U)2) is bigger than that in
MRSE I with complexity O(mn2) as shown in both Fig. 3.4(a) and Fig. 3.4(b). As
presented in section 3.5.1, both MRSE I TF and MRSE II TF introduce more com-
putation during the index construction since we need to collect the term frequency
information for each keyword in every document and then perform the normaliza-
tion calculation. But, as shown in both gures, such additional computation in the
TF  IDF weighting rule is insignicant considering much more computation are
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caused by the splitting process and matrix multiplication. Although the time of
building index is not a negligible overhead for the data owner, this is a one-time
operation before data outsourcing. Besides, Tab. 3.3 lists the storage overhead of
each subindex in two MRSE schemes within dierent sizes of dictionary. The size of
subindex with complexity O(n) is absolutely linear with the dimensionality of data
vector which is determined by the number of keywords in the dictionary. The sizes
of subindex are very close in the two MRSE schemes because of trivial dierences
in the dimensionality of data vectors.
3.6.2.2 Trapdoor Generation
Fig. 3.5(a) shows that the time to generate a trapdoor is greatly aected by the
number of keywords in the dictionary. Like index construction, every trapdoor
generation incurs two multiplications of a matrix and a split query vector, where
the dimensionality of matrix or query vector is dierent in two proposed schemes
and becomes larger with the increasing size of dictionary. Fig. 3.5(b) demonstrates
the trapdoor generation cost in the MRSE II scheme with complexity O((n+ U)2)
is about 10 percentages larger than that in the MRSE I scheme with complexity
O(n2). The MRSE I TF and MRSE II TF have similar dierence where the ad-
ditional logarithm computation accounts for very small proportion of the whole
trapdoor generation. Like the subindex generation, the dierence of costs to gen-
erate trapdoors is majorally caused by the dierent dimensionality of vector and
matrices in the two MRSE schemes. More importantly, it shows that the number of
query keywords has little inuence on the overhead of trapdoor generation, which is
a signicant advantage over related works on multi-keyword searchable encryption.
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(a) For the same query keywords within dierent
sizes of dictionary, t = 10
(b) For dierent numbers of query keywords
within the same dictionary, n = 4000
Figure 3.5: Time cost of generating trapdoor.
3.6.2.3 Query
Query execution in the cloud server consists of computing and ranking similarity
scores for all documents in the dataset. The computation of similarity scores for the
whole data collection is O(mn) in MRSE I and MRSE I TF, and the computation
increases to O(m(n + U)) in MRSE II and MRSE II TF. Fig. 3.6 shows the query
time is dominated by the number of documents in the dataset while the number of
keywords in the query has very slight impact on it like the cost of trapdoor generation
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(a) For the same query keywords in dierent sizes
of dataset, t = 10
(b) For dierent numbers of query keywords in
the same dataset, m = 1000
Figure 3.6: Time cost of query.
above. The two schemes in the known ciphertext model as MRSE I and MRSE I TF
have very similar query speed since they have the same dimensionality which is the
major factor deciding the computation cost in the query. The query speed dierence
between MRSE I and MRSE I TF or between MRSE II and MRSE II TF is also
caused by the dimensionality of data vector and query vector. With respect to the
communication cost in Query, the size of the trapdoor is the same as that of the
subindex listed in the Tab. 3.3, which keeps constant given the same dictionary,
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Table 3.3: Size of subindex/trapdoor
Size of dictionary 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
MRSE I (KB) 31:3 46:9 62:5 78:1 93:8
MRSE II (KB) 32:5 48:1 63:8 79:4 95:0
no matter how many keywords are contained in a query. While the computation
and communication cost in the query procedure is linear with the number of query
keywords in other multiple-keyword search schemes [24, 52], our proposed schemes
introduce nearly constant overhead while increasing the number of query keywords.
3.7 Related Work
3.7.1 Single Keyword Searchable Encryption
Traditional single keyword searchable encryption schemes [6,7,15,17,18,22,23,27,35,
40,51,65,98,104,106,115] usually build an encrypted searchable index such that its
content is hidden to the server unless it is given appropriate trapdoors generated via
secret key(s) [58]. It is rst studied by Song et al. [98] in the symmetric key setting,
in which each word in the document is encrypted independently under a special
two-layered encryption construction. Thus, a searching overhead is linear to the
whole le collection length. Goh [51] developed a Bloom Filter based per-le index,
reducing the work load for each search request proportional to the number of les
in the collection. Chang et al. [35] also developed a similar per-le index scheme.
To further enhance search eciency, Curtmola et al. [40] proposed a per-keyword
based approach, where a single encrypted hash table index is built for the entire le
collection, with each entry consisting of the trapdoor of a keyword and an encrypted
set of related le identiers. Searchable encryption has also been considered in the
public-key setting. Boneh et al. [22] presented the rst public-key based searchable
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encryption scheme, with an analogous scenario to that of [98]. In their construction,
anyone with the public key can write to the data stored on the server but only
authorized users with the private key can search. Improved denitions are proposed
in [7]. Compared to symmetric searchable encryption, public key solutions are
usually very computationally expensive. Furthermore, the keyword privacy could
not be protected in the public key setting since server could encrypt any keyword
with public key and then use the received trapdoor to evaluate this ciphertext.
Besides, aiming at tolerance of both minor typos and format inconsistencies in
the user search input, fuzzy keyword search over encrypted cloud data has been
proposed by Li. et al.in [65] and further extended by Wang. et al. [108]. Note that
none of all these schemes support the ranked search problem which we are focusing
in this chapter. As an attempt to enrich query experience, our early works [104,106]
solve secure ranked keyword search which utilizes keyword frequency to rank results
instead of return undierentiated results. However, it only supports single keyword
ranked search.
3.7.2 Boolean Keyword Searchable Encryption
To expand search functionalities, conjunctive keyword search [14,16,24,28,29,52,55,
76, 77, 80, 97] over encrypted data have been proposed. The trapdoor construction
in most of these schemes clearly indicates which keyword eld will be searched in
a query, and therefore exposes information related to keyword privacy and search
pattern. These schemes incur large overhead caused by their fundamental primi-
tives, such as computation cost by bilinear map, e.g. [24], or communication cost by
secret sharing, e.g. [16]. As a more general search approach, predicate encryption
schemes [59, 63, 93, 95] are recently proposed to support both conjunctive and dis-
junctive keyword search capabilities, and even support inner product. Conjunctive
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keyword search returns \all-or-nothing", which means it only returns those docu-
ments in which all the keywords specied by the search query appear; disjunctive
keyword search returns undierentiated results, which means it returns every doc-
ument that contains a subset of the specic keywords, even only one keyword of
interest. Note that, inner product queries in predicate encryption only predicates
whether two vectors are orthogonal or not, i.e., the inner product value is concealed
except when it equals zero. Without providing the capability to compare concealed
inner products, predicate encryption is not qualied for performing ranked search.
In short, none of existing Boolean keyword searchable encryption schemes support
multiple keywords ranked search over encrypted cloud data while preserving privacy
as we explore in this chapter. Furthermore, most of these schemes are built upon
the expensive evaluation of pairing operations on elliptic curves. Search query is
rst converted into a polynomial before generating a trapdoor, and computation
complexity is polynomial on dt where t is the number of variables and d is the
maximum degree of the resulting polynomial in each variable [59]. Such ineciency
disadvantage also limits their practical performance when deployed in the cloud.
Portions of the work studied in this chapter were presented as extended abstract at
the 30th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'11) [30]. In
this chapter we extend and improve more technical details as compared to [30].
3.7.3 Secure Top-K Retrieval from Database Community
In database community, [8, 21, 48, 102, 130] are the most related works to our pro-
posed search schemes. The idea of uniformly distributing posting elements using an
order-preserving cryptographic function was rst discussed in [102]. However, the
order-preserving mapping function proposed in [102] does not support score dynam-
ics, i.e., any insertion and updates of the scores in the index will result in the posting
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list completely rebuilt. [130] uses a dierent order-preserving mapping based on
pre-sampling and training of the relevance scores to be outsourced, which is not
as ecient as our proposed schemes. When scores following dierent distributions
need to be inserted, their score transformation function still needs to be rebuilt. On
the contrary, in our scheme the score dynamics can be gracefully handled. We note
that supporting score dynamics, which can save quite a lot of computation over-
head when le collection changes, is a signicant advantage in our scheme. Most
important, all the works based on order-preserving mapping techniques do not well
support multi-keyword search. Since the order-preserving mapping is only designed
for every single keyword, the simple sum of encrypted scores does not preserve the
order of the sum of original scores. [48] does not take into consideration the term
frequency of keywords during the query which causes the low search quality.
3.7.4 Other Related Techniques
Allowing range queries over encrypted data has been studied in both public key
setting [24, 94], where advanced privacy preserving schemes were proposed to allow
more sophisticated multi-attribute search over encrypted les. Though these two
schemes provide provably strong security, they do not support the ordered result
listing on the server side. Thus, they can not be eectively utilized in our settings
since the user still does not know which retrieved les would be the most relevant.
Related research on range queries in symmetric key setting [9, 10] do not provide
provable security guarantee.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, for the rst time we dene and solve the problem of multi-keyword
ranked search over encrypted cloud data, and establish a variety of privacy require-
ments. Among various multi-keyword semantics, we choose the ecient similarity
measure of \coordinate matching", i.e., as many matches as possible, to eectively
capture the relevance of outsourced documents to the query keywords, and use \inner
product similarity" to quantitatively evaluate such similarity measure. For meeting
the challenge of supporting multi-keyword semantic without privacy breaches, we
propose a basic idea of MRSE using secure inner product computation. Then we
give two improved MRSE schemes to achieve various stringent privacy requirements
in two dierent threat models. We also investigate some further enhancements of our
ranked search mechanism, including supporting more search semantics, i.e., TF 
IDF, and dynamic data operations. Thorough analysis investigating privacy and ef-
ciency guarantees of proposed schemes is given, and experiments on the real-world
dataset show our proposed schemes introduce low overhead on both computation
and communication.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Query over
Encrypted Graph-Structured Data
4.1 Introduction
In the increasingly prevalent cloud computing, datacenters play a fundamental role
as the major cloud infrastructure providers [11], such as Amazon, Google, and Mi-
crosoft. Datacenters provide the utility computing service to software providers who
further provide the application service to end users through Internet. The later ser-
vice has long been called \Software as a Service (SaaS)", and the former service has
recently been called \Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)", where the software service
provider is also referred to as cloud service provider. To take advantage of computing
and storage resources provided by cloud infrastructure providers, data owners out-
source more and more data to the datacenters [58] through cloud service providers,
e.g., the online storage service provider, which are not fully trusted by data owners.
As a general data structure to describe the relation between entities, the graph has
been increasingly used to model complicated structures and schemaless data, such
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as the personal social network (the social graph), the relational database, XML doc-
uments and chemical compounds studied by research labs [38, 91, 92, 128, 132, 133].
Images in the personal album can also be modeled as the attributed relational graph
(ARG) [20]. For the protection of users' privacy, these sensitive data have to be en-
crypted before outsourcing to the cloud. Moreover, some data are supposed to be
shared among trusted partners. For example, the album owner may share family
party photos with only authorized users including family members and friends. For
another example, the lab director and members are given the authorization to access
the entire lab data. In both cases, authorized users are usually planning to retrieve
some portion of data they are interested rather than the entire dataset, mostly be-
cause of the \pay-for-use" billing rule in the cloud computing paradigm. Considering
the large amount of data centralized in the datacenter, it is a very challenging task
to eectively utilize the graph-structured data after encryption.
With the conventional graph data utilization method, we rst take the query
graph as an input, and then perform the graph containment query: given a query
graph as Q and a collection of data graphs as G = (G1; G2; : : : ; Gm), nd all the
supergraphs of Q in G, denoted as GQ. The straightforward solution is to check
whether Q is subgraph isomorphic to every Gi in G or not. However, checking sub-
graph isomorphism is NP-complete, and therefore it is infeasible to employ such
costly solution. To eciently solve the graph containment query problem, there
have been a lot of proposed techniques [38, 91, 92, 128, 132, 133], most of which fol-
low the principle of \ltering-and-verication". In the ltering phase, a pre-built
feature-based index is utilized to prune as many data graphs from the dataset as
possible and output the candidate supergraph set. Every feature in the index is a
fragment of a data graph, e.g., the subgraph. In the verication phase, each candi-
date supergraph is veried by checking subgraph isomorphism. Since the candidate
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supergraph set is much smaller than the entire dataset, such approach involves less
subgraph isomorphism checking, and therefore is signicantly more ecient than the
straightforward solution. However, when data graphs are stored in the encrypted
form in the cloud, the encryption excludes the ltering method which is based on the
plaintext index. Recently, Chase and Kamara proposed structured encryption [36]
to handle private access to parts of a large graph in encrypted form; yet only simple
operations such as neighbor queries are supported.
In the most related literature, the searchable encryption [22,30,40,64,65,106] is
a helpful technique that treats encrypted data as documents and allows a user to
securely search over it through specifying single keyword or multiple keywords with
Boolean relations. However, the direct application of these approaches to deploy
the secure large scale cloud data utilization system would not be necessarily suit-
able. The keyword-based search provides much less semantics than the graph-based
query since the graph could characterize more complicated relations than Boolean
relation. More importantly, these searchable encryption schemes are developed as
crypto primitives and cannot accommodate such high service-level requirements like
system usability, user query experience, and easy information discovery in mind.
Therefore, how to design an ecient encrypted query mechanism which supports
graph semantics without privacy breaches still remains a challenging open problem.
In this chapter, for the rst time, we dene and solve the problem of privacy-
preserving graph query in cloud computing (PPGQ). To reduce the times of checking
subgraph isomorphism, we adopt the ecient principle of \ltering-and-verication"
to prune as many negative data graphs as possible before verication. A feature-
based index is rstly built to provide feature-related information about every en-
crypted data graph. Then, we choose the ecient inner product as the pruning tool
to carry out the ltering procedure. To achieve this functionality in index construc-
80
tion, each data graph is associated with a binary vector as a subindex where each bit
represents whether the corresponding feature is subgraph isomorphic to this data
graph or not. The query graph is also described as a binary vector where each bit
means whether the corresponding feature is contained in this query graph or not.
The inner product of the query vector and the data vector could exactly measure the
number of query features contained in the data graph, which is used to lter negative
data graphs that do not contain the query graph. However, directly outsourcing the
data vector or the query vector will violate the index privacy or the query privacy.
To meet the challenge of supporting graph semantics without privacy breaches, we
propose a secure inner product computation mechanism, which is adapted from a
secure k-nearest neighbor (kNN ) technique [120], and then show our improvements
on it to achieve various privacy requirements under the known-background threat
model. Our contributions are summarized as follows,
1) For the rst time, we explore the problem of query over encrypted graph-structured
data in cloud computing, and establish a set of strict privacy requirements for such
a secure cloud data utilization system to become a reality.
2) Our proposed scheme follows the principle of \ltering-and-verication" for ef-
ciency consideration, and thorough analysis investigating privacy and eciency
guarantees of the proposed scheme is given.
3) The evaluation, which is performed with the widely-used AIDS antiviral screen
dataset on the Amazon EC2 cloud infrastructure, further shows our proposed scheme
introduces low computation and communication overhead.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we intro-
duce the system model, the threat model and our design goals. Section 4.3 gives
preliminaries, and section 4.4 describes the framework and privacy requirements
in PPGQ, followed by section 4.5, which gives our proposed scheme. Section 4.6
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of graph query over encrypted cloud data
presents evaluation results. We discuss related work on both keyword searchable
encryption and graph containment query in Section 4.7, and conclude the chapter
in Section 4.8.
4.2 Problem Formulation
4.2.1 The System Model
Considering a cloud data storage service, involving four dierent entities: the data
owner, the data user, the storage service provider/cloud service provider, and the
datacenter/cloud infrastructure provider. To take advantage of the utility comput-
ing services provided by the datacenter, e.g., computing and storage resources, the
storage service provider deploys its storage service on top of the utility computing
in datacenter and delivers the service to end users (including data owners and data
users) through Internet. In our system model, neither cloud service provider nor
cloud infrastructure provider is fully trusted by data owners or data users, so they
are treated as an integrated entity, named the cloud server, as shown in Fig. 4.1.
The data owner has a graph-structured dataset G to be outsourced to the cloud
server in the encrypted form eG. To enable the query capability over eG for eective
data utilization, the data owner will build an encrypted searchable index I from G
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before data outsourcing, and then both the index I and the encrypted graph dataseteG are outsourced to the cloud server. For every query graph Q, an authorized user
acquires a corresponding trapdoor TQ through the search control mechanism, e.g.,
broadcast encryption [40], and then sends it to the cloud server. Upon receiving TQ
from data users, the cloud server is responsible to perform query over the encrypted
index I and return the encrypted candidate supergraphs. Finally, data users decrypt
the candidate supergraphs through the access control mechanism, and verify each
candidate by checking subgraph isomorphism.
4.2.2 The Known Background Threat Model
The cloud server is considered as \honest-but-curious" in our model, which is con-
sistent with most related works on searchable encryption [30, 129]. Specically, the
cloud server acts in an \honest" fashion and correctly follows the designated pro-
tocol specication. However, it is \curious" to infer and analyze the data and the
index in its storage and interactions during the protocol so as to learn additional
information. The encrypted data eG and searchable index I can be easily obtained
by the cloud server, because both of them are outsourced and stored on the cloud
server. In addition to these encrypted information, the cloud server is supposed to
know some backgrounds on the dataset, such as its subject and related statistical
information. As a possible attack similar to that in [130], the cloud server could
utilize the feature frequency to identify features contained in the query graph.
4.2.3 Design Goals
To enable the graph query for the eective utilization of outsourced cloud data under
the aforementioned model, our design should simultaneously achieve security and
performance guarantees.
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 Eectiveness: To design a graph query scheme that introduces few false
positives in the candidate supergraph set.
 Privacy: To prevent the cloud server from learning additional information
over outsourced data and index in query interactions, and to meet privacy
requirements specied in section 4.4.3.
 Eciency: Above goals on eectiveness and privacy should be achieved with
low communication and computation overhead.
4.2.4 Notations
 G { the graph-structured dataset, denoted as a collection of m data graphs
G = (G1; G2; : : : ; Gm).
 eG { the encrypted graph-structured dataset outsourced into the cloud, denoted
as eG = ( eG1; eG2; : : : ; eGm).
 id(Gi) { the identier of the data graph Gi that can help uniquely locate the
graph.
 F { the feature set mined from the graph dataset, denoted asF = (F1; F2; : : : ; Fn).
 D { the frequent feature dictionary, denoted asD = fLF1 ;LF2 ; : : : ;LFng, where
LFj is the unique canonical label of Fj;
 I { the searchable index associated with eG, denoted as (I1; I2; : : : ; Im), where
each subindex Ii is built from Gi.
 Q { the query graph from the data user.
 FQ { the subset of F , consisting of frequent features contained in Q, denoted
as FQ = fFjjFj  Q;Fj 2 Fg.
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 GfQg { the subset of G, consisting of exact supergraphs of the graph Q, denoted
as GfQg = fid(Gi)jQ  Gi; Gi 2 Gg.
 GFQ { the subset of G, consisting of candidate supergraphs of the graph Q,
denoted as GFQ = \GfFjg, where Fj 2 FQ.
 TQ { the trapdoor for the query graph Q.
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 Graph Query
A labeled, undirected, and connected graph is a ve-tuple as fV;E;V ;E; Lg,
where V is the vertex set, E  V  V is the edge set, and L is a labeling function:
V ! V and E ! E. We use the number of vertices jV (G)j to represent the size
of the graph G.
Subgraph Isomorphism Given two graphs G = fV;E;V ;E; Lg and G0 =
fV 0; E 0;V ;E; L0g, G is subgraph isomorphic to G0 if there is an injection f :
V ! V 0 such that
1. 8 v 2 V; L(v) = L0(f(v)).
2. 8 (u; v) 2 E; (f(u); f(v)) 2 E 0.
3. 8 (u; v) 2 E;L(u; v) = L0(f(u); f(v)).
Graph Containment Query If G is subgraph isomorphic to G0, we call G is a
subgraph of G0 or G0 is a supergraph of G, denoted as G  G0. Such relation is also
referred to as G is contained by G0 or G0 contains G. Given a graph dataset G =
(G1; G2; : : : ; Gm) and a query graph Q, a graph containment query problem is to nd
all the supergraphs ofQ from the dataset G, denoted as GfQg = fid(Gi)jQ  Gi; Gi 2
Gg where id(Gi) is the identier of the graph Gi. The number of supergraphs of Q,
85
i.e., jGfQgj, is called the support, or the frequency of Q.
Considering the large size of the graph dataset, it is impractical to solve the
graph containment query problem by sequentially checking whether Q is subgraph
isomorphic to each graph in G or not, because checking subgraph isomorphism has
been proved to be NP-complete [50]. To reduce the times of checking subgraph
isomorphism, most graph query works [38, 91, 92, 128, 132, 133] follow the principle
of \ltering-and-verication".
Filtering-and-Verication In the ltering phase, a feature-based index for the
dataset G is utilized to prune most negative data graphs that does not contain the
query graph Q, and then produce the candidate supergraph set. In the verication
phase, the subgraph isomorphism is checked between the query graph and every
candidate supergraph to output the exact supergraph set GfQg.
The feature-based index is pre-built from the entire graph dataset, where each
feature Fj is a substructure of a data graph in the dataset, such as subpath [92],
subtree [91, 132, 133] and subsubgraph [38, 128]. Let F = (F1; F2; : : : ; Fn) represent
the feature set. The supergraph set of every feature Fj, denoted as GfFjg, is stored
in the index. Let FQ = fFjjFj  Q;Fj 2 Fg denote the query feature set consisting
of features contained in the query graph. Then, the candidate supergraphs of the
query graph G can be obtained by the intersection operation as GFQ = \GfFkg,
where Fk 2 FQ. The false positive ratio is then dened as jGFQ jjGfQgj
Frequent and Discriminative Substructure It is infeasible and unnecessary to
index every possible substructure of all the graphs in a large dataset, and therefore
only frequent and discriminative substructures are indexed to reduce the index size.
A feature Fj is frequent if its support, or frequency is large enough, i.e., jGfFjgj  ,
where  is called the minimum support. A feature Fj is discriminative if it can
provide more pruning power than its subgraph feature set, i.e.,
j\kGfFkgj
jGfFjgj
 , where
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Fk  Fj and  is called the discriminative threshold.
4.3.2 Secure Euclidean Distance Computation
In order to compute the inner product in a privacy-preserving method, we will adapt
the secure Euclidean distance computation in the secure k-nearest neighbor (kNN)
scheme [120]. In this scheme, the Euclidean distance between a database record pi
and a query vector q is used to select k nearest database records. The secret key is
composed of one (d+1)-bit vector as S and two (d+1) (d+1) invertible matrices
as fM1;M2g, where d is the number of elds for each record pi. First, every data
vector pi and the query vector q are extended to (d + 1)-dimensional vectors as ~pi
and ~q, where the (d+1)-th dimension is set to  0:5jjp2i jj and 1, respectively. Besides,
the query vector ~q is scaled by a random number r > 0 as (rq; r). Then, ~pi is split
into two random vectors as f~pi0; ~pi00g, and ~q is also split into two random vectors
as f~q 0; ~q 00g. Note here that vector S functions as a splitting indicator. Namely,
if the j-th bit of S is 0, ~pi
0[j] and ~pi00[j] are set as the same as ~pi[j], while ~q 0[j]
and ~q 00[j] are set to two random numbers so that their sum is equal to ~q[j]; if the
j-th bit of S is 1, the splitting process is similar except that ~pi and ~q are switched.
The split data vector pair f~pi0; ~pi00g is encrypted as fMT1 ~pi0;MT2 ~pi00g, and the split
query vector pair f~q 0; ~q 00g is encrypted as fM 11 ~q 0;M 12 ~q 00g. In the query step, the
product of the data vector pair and the query vector pair, i.e.,  0:5r(jjpijj2 2pi q),
is serving as the indicator of the Euclidean distance (jjpijj2  2pi  q+ jjqjj2) to select
k nearest neighbors. Without prior knowledge of the secret key, neither the data
vector nor the query vector, after such a series of processes, can be recovered by
analyzing their corresponding ciphertexts. The security analysis in [120] shows
that this computation technique is secure against known-plaintext attack, which is
roughly equal in security to a d-bit symmetric key. Therefore, d should be no less
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than 80 to make the search space suciently large.
4.4 PPGQ: The Framework and Privacy
In this section, we dene the framework of query over encrypted graph-structured
data in cloud computing and establish various strict system-wise privacy require-
ments for such a secure cloud data utilization system.
4.4.1 The Framework
Our proposed framework focuses on how the query works with the help of index
which is outsourced to the cloud server. We do not illustrate how the data itself is
encrypted, outsourced or accessed, as this is a complementary and orthogonal issue
and has been studied elsewhere [129]. The framework of PPGQ is illustrated as
follows.
 FSCon(G; ) Takes the graph dataset G and the minimum support  as inputs,
outputs a frequent feature set F .
 KeyGen() Takes a secret  as input and outputs a symmetric key K.
 BuildIndex(G;K) Takes the graph dataset G and the symmetric key K as inputs,
output a searchable index I.
 TDGen(Q;K) Takes the query graph Q and the symmetric key K as inputs,
outputs a corresponding trapdoor TQ.
 Query(TQ; I) Takes the trapdoor TQ and the searchable index I as inputs, re-
turns GFQ, i.e., the candidate supergraphs of query graph Q.
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The rst three algorithms, i.e., FSCon, BuildIndex, and BuildIndex, are run by the
data owner as pre-processes. The query algorithm is run on the cloud server as a part
of the cloud data storage service. According to various search control mechanisms,
the trapdoor generation algorithm TDGen may be run by either the data owner
or the data user. Besides, depending on some specic application scenarios, while
search requests on condential documents may be allowed for all users, the access
to document contents may be forbidden for those low-priority data users. Note that
neither search control or access control are within the scope of this dissertation.
4.4.2 Choosing Frequent Features
To build a feature-based index, there are three choices of features, i.e., subpath, sub-
tree and subgraph, which can be extracted from the graph dataset. According to
the feature comparison in [133], with the same minimum support, either subtree-
based or subgraph-based feature set is larger than subpath-based one, especially
when the feature size is between 5 and 20. To be consistent with the size of graph
which is jV (G)j, the size of feature is measured by its number of vertices jV (Fi)j.
As for the cloud server, the larger feature set will demand more index storage, and
also incur larger computation cost during the query process. However, the pruning
power of the subgraph-based index performs the best among all the three choices,
which leads to the lowest false positive ratio and the smallest candidate supergraph
set.From the perspective of the data user, the size of the candidate supergraph set
has a direct and important impact on the communication and computation cost.
Compared with the powerful cloud server, data users may access the cloud server
through portable devices, e.g., mobile phones and netbooks, which have limited ca-
pability of communication and computation to retrieve the candidate supergraph set
and check subgraph isomorphism. To this end, the subgraph-based index is more
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appropriate than the other two choices for our PPGQ framework that is designed for
the ecient graph-structured data utilization in cloud computing. To generate the
frequent feature set, there have been a lot of frequent subgraph mining algorithms
over the large graph dataset, such as gSpan [127], and Gaston [72]. For the index-
ing purpose, every frequent subgraph should be represented as a unique canonical
label which can be accomplished by existing graph sequentialization techniques, like
CAM [54] and DFS [127]. Besides, the shrinking process on the frequent feature
set is not adopted in our framework since it will weaken the pruning power of index.
As the subgraph is chosen as the feature to build index in our framework, we do
not distinguish between frequent feature and frequent subgraph in the rest of this
chapter.
4.4.3 Privacy Requirements
As described in the framework, data privacy is to prevent the cloud server from
prying into outsourced data, and can be well protected by existing access control
mechanism [129]. In related works on privacy-preserving query, like searchable en-
cryption [40], representative privacy requirement is that the server should learn
nothing but query results. With this general privacy statement, we explore and es-
tablish a set of stringent privacy requirements specically for the PPGQ framework.
While data privacy guarantees are demanded by default in the related literature,
various query privacy requirements involved in the query procedure are more com-
plex and dicult to tackle as follows.
4.4.3.1 Index Privacy
With respect to the index privacy, if the cloud server deduces any association be-
tween frequent features and encrypted dataset from outsourced index, it may learn
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Feature Support
the major structure of a graph, or even the entire topology of a small graph. There-
fore, searchable index should be constructed in such a way that prevents the cloud
server from performing such kind of association attack.
4.4.3.2 Feature Privacy
Data users usually prefer to keep their query from being exposed to others like the
cloud server, and the most important concern is to hide what they are querying, i.e.,
the features indicated by the corresponding trapdoor. Although trapdoor can be
generated in a cryptographic way to protect the query features, the cloud server may
do some statistical analysis over the search results to make an estimate. Especially,
the feature support (i.e., the number of data graphs containing the feature), a kind
of statistical information, is sucient to identify the feature with high probability.
When the cloud server knows some background information of the dataset, this
feature-specic information can be utilized to reverse-engineer the feature. As pre-
sented in Fig. 4.2, the distribution of feature support in the AIDS antiviral screen
dataset [5] provides enough information to identify most frequent features in the
dataset. Such problem is similar with the keyword privacy issue in [131], where
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document frequency (the number of documents containing the keyword) is used as
a statistical information to reverse-engineer the keyword.
4.4.3.3 Trapdoor Unlinkability
The trapdoor generation function should be a randomized one instead of being
deterministic. In particular, the cloud server should not be able to deduce the re-
lationship of any given trapdoors, e.g., to determine whether the two trapdoors
are formed by the same search request or not. Otherwise, the deterministic trap-
door generation would give the cloud server advantage to accumulate frequencies
of dierent search requests regarding dierent features, which may further violate
the aforementioned feature privacy requirement. So the fundamental protection for
trapdoor unlinkability is to introduce sucient nondeterminacy into the trapdoor
generation procedure.
4.4.3.4 Access Pattern
Access pattern is the sequence of query results where each query result is GFQ ,
including the id list of candidate supergraphs of the query graph. Then the access
pattern is denoted as (GFQ1 ;GFQ1 ; : : :) which are the results of sequential queries.
In related literature, although a few schemes (e.g., [23, 29]) have been proposed
to utilize private information retrieval (PIR) technique [56] to hide access pattern,
our proposed schemes are not designed to protect access pattern for the eciency
concerns. This is because any PIR-based technique must \touch" the whole dataset
outsourced on the server which is inecient in the large scale cloud system. To this
end, the query result of any single feature Fj, which is part of access pattern, cannot
be hidden from the cloud server. Such query result GfFjg will directly expose the
support of the feature, and break the feature privacy as discussed above. Therefore,
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we do not consider the single-feature query in our proposed schemes.
4.5 PPGQ: The Proposed Scheme and Analysis
In order to accomplish the ltering purpose in the graph query procedure, the data
graph Gi is selected as a candidate supergraph of the query graph Q if and only if
Gi contains all the frequent features in Q. Let i represent the number of query
features contained in the data graph Gi. For every candidate supergraph Gi, its
corresponding i should be equal to the size of the query feature set FQ, i.e., i =
jFQj. To obtain the candidate supergraph set, we propose to employ the ecient
inner product computation for pruning negative data graphs Gj that do not contain
the query graph, i.e., j < FQ. Specically, every data graph Gi is formalized as a
bit vector gi where each bit gi[j] is determined by checking whether Gi contains the
frequent feature Fj or not. If Fj  Gi, gi[j] is set as 1; otherwise, it is set as 0. The
query graph Q is formalized as a bit vector q where each bit q[j] also represents the
existence of the frequent feature Fj in the query feature set FQ. Then, i can be
acquired via computing the inner product of the data vector gi and the query vector
q, i.e., gi  q. To preserve the strict system-wise privacy, the data vector gi and the
query vector q should not be exposed to the cloud server. In this section, we rst
design a secure inner product computation mechanism, which is adapted from the
secure Euclidean distance computation technique, and then show how to improve it
to be privacy-preserving under the known-background threat model.
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Table 4.1: Analysis on inner products in two correlated queries
G FQ FQ0 = FQ
SfFkg yi0=yi 0   
Gi yi = ri i
0 = i + 1; yi0 = r0i0 i+1i  r
0
r
1
Gj yj = rj j
0 = j; yj 0 = r0j 0 r
0
r
0
4.5.1 Privacy Concerns on Secure Inner Product Computa-
tion
Since the inner product of the data vector and the query vector is preferred to select
candidate supergraphs of the query graph, the secure Euclidean distance compu-
tation technique in the secure kNN scheme [120] cannot be directly utilized here.
As shown in Section 3.4.1, by eliminating the extended dimension which is related
to the Euclidean distance, the nal inner product result changes to be r(gi  q).
Since the new result r(gi  q) can serve as an indicator of the original inner prod-
uct gi  q, it seems that an ecient and secure inner product computation scheme
can be appropriately achieved. However, the cloud server may break the feature
privacy via analyzing nal inner products and guring out some feature-specic sta-
tistical information, e.g., the support of feature. With the background knowledge
of the outsourced graph dataset, which can be obtained by the cloud server under
the known-background model, such feature-specic information could be further
utilized to identify what feature is included in the query at high probability. We
rst demonstrate how such statistical analysis attack could break feature privacy as
follows.
Whenever there exist two query graphs which have inclusion relationship, the
cloud server could explore the relationship among nal inner products in two queries.
Assume that TQ and TQ0 be trapdoors for two query graphs Q and Q
0, and their
corresponding query feature sets have the inclusion relation as FQ  FQ0 . Especially,
when the dierential feature subset contains only one feature, i.e., jFQ00j = 1 where
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FQ00 = FQ0nFQ, the cloud server can deduce an estimate of the support of the
dierential feature and further identify this feature with the background knowledge
of the graph dataset. As listed in Tab. 4.1, the second query feature set FQ0 includes
one more feature as Fk than the rst one FQ. The cloud server evaluates the
expression yi
0=yi, which is equal to (i0=i)(r0=r) for every graphGi, and then obtains
a large number of dierent values. However, these values could be distinguished into
two categories. If the graph Gi does not contain the feature Fk, i.e., i
0 = i, its
corresponding expression evaluation yi
0=yi is equal to r0=r; otherwise, it is larger
than r0=r and can be easily detected because of its special ratio as i+1
i
. Therefore,
the minimum values over the whole dataset indicate that corresponding data graphs
do not contain the feature Fk, and other graphs with larger values contain it. In
addition, by checking whether the expression yi is equal to 0 or not, the special
case where the data graph Gi contains neither feature in FQ can be recognized by
the cloud server. In such case, the existence of feature Fk in Gi can be determined
by checking whether the expression yi
0 is equal to 0 or not. To this end, the total
number of data graphs containing this feature, i.e., jGfFkgj, is uncovered. Under the
known-background threat model, the cloud server could break the feature privacy
with both the support of single feature and the distribution of all the supports as
illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
4.5.2 The Proposed Privacy-Preserving Graph Query Scheme
The statistical analysis attack shown above works when the nal inner product yi is
a multiple of i, i.e., the number of query features contained in the data graph Gi.
To this end, we should break such scale relationship to make the previous statistical
analysis attack infeasible. Our proposed design is to convert both the data vector
and the query vector from the bit structure to more sophisticated structures. Specif-
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Figure 4.3: Build subindex for each data graph
Figure 4.4: Generate trapdoor for query graph
ically, if the frequent feature Fj is contained in the data graph Gi, the corresponding
element gi[j] in the data vector gi is set as [j] instead of 1 where  is a n-dimensional
vector; otherwise, gi[j] is set as X[i][j] where X is a n n matrix and X[i][j] is a ran-
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dom number less than [j]. Correspondingly, if Fj is contained in the query graph
Q, q[j] is set as a positive random number rj instead of 1; otherwise, q[j] is set as 0.
In addition, to hide the original inner product, we resume the dimension extending
operation where the gi[n+1] is set as 1 and the q[n+1] is set as a random number t. As
a result of these modications, the nal inner product of the data vector and the
query vector, i.e., gi  q+ t, should be equal to   q+ t for any candidate supergraph.
Note that, the vector  is constant as a part of the secret key, but t and rj in q are
randomly generated for each query. Our proposed privacy-preserving graph query
scheme is designed as follows with details in Fig. 4.10.
 FSCon(G; ) The data owner utilizes existing frequent subgraph mining algo-
rithms to generate the frequent subgraph set F , and then creates the frequent
feature dictionary D and the feature-based inverted index Iinv.
 KeyGen(KS; n) With the master key KS, the data owner generates the secret
keyK, consisting of the splitting indicator S, two invertible matrices fM1;M2g,
and the vector .
 BuildIndex(G;F ;K) For each data graphGi, this algorithm creates the subindex
Ii as shown in Fig. 4.3. The data owner rst creates a vector gi with length
n, in which the value of gi[j] is determined by whether graph Gi contains the
corresponding feature Fj or not (steps 1 and 2). Subsequently, the data vector
gi is processed by applying the dimension extending where the (n+ 1)-th en-
try in ~gi is set to 1 (step 3) and further adopting the splitting and encrypting
procedures in the secure Euclidean Distance computation scheme (steps 4 and
5). Finally, a subindex Ii = f(M 11 )T ~gi0; (M 12 )T ~gi00g is created for every data
graph Gi and associated with the encrypted data graph eGi for outsourcing to
the cloud server .
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 TDGen(Q) With the query graph Q as input from the data user, this algorithm
outputs the trapdoor TQ as shown in Fig. 4.4. The query feature set FQ is
rst generated through checking which features in F are also contained in Q
(steps 1 and 2). An n-dimensional vector q is created by assigning a positive
random number rj to the element q[j] if Fj 2 FQ; otherwise, q[j] = 0 (step 3).
This initial query vector q is then extended to an (n + 1)-dimensional vector
as ~q = (q; t), where t is a non-zero random number (step 4). After adopt-
ing the splitting and encrypting processes in the secure Euclidean distance
computation technique (steps 5 and 6), the trapdoor TQ for the query graph
Q is generated as fM1~q0;M2~q00;
P
[j]q[j] + tg, where the third element is the
expected nal inner product of the query vector and the data vector for every
candidate supergraph.
 Query(I; TQ) With the trapdoor TQ, the cloud server computes the inner prod-
uct of fTQ[1]; TQ[2]g with every subindex Ii for data graph Gi, and returns graph
id list GFQ where each graph has an inner product as exactly same as TQ[3].
The data user can further do the graph verication to remove false positives
from GFQ , and nally get the exact result as GfQg.
4.5.3 The Analysis
Analysis of this proposed scheme follows three aspects of design goals described in
Section 4.2.3.
4.5.3.1 Eectiveness
Assume Q consists of ` query features, i.e., ` = jFQj. For any supergraph Gi of
the query graph Q, it includes all the ` features in FQ which is extracted from Q.
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Therefore, all the ` corresponding elements in the data vector are equal to those in
the , respectively, i.e., gi[jk] = [jk], where 1  k  `. Besides, each corresponding
element in the query vector as qi[jk] is set as rjk , and all other elements is set as 0.
The nal inner product gi q+ t for any supergraph Gi is then equal to
P
[jk]rjk+ t,
which is also the result of   q + t. The later one   q + t has been included in the
trapdoor and serves as an indicator to select candidate supergraphs. It means that
our scheme does not introduce any false negative into the result GFQ , as every exact
supergraph in GfQg will produce the same inner product as   q + t with the query
vector. But false positive supergraphs may be introduced into GFQ by those data
graphs that do not contain the query graph Q but contain all the features in FQ.
4.5.3.2 Eciency
As far as the data user is concerned, the query response is well presented because
the nal inner product for every data graph can be eciently computed by the
cloud server via two multiplications of (n+1)-dimensional vectors. The whole inner
product computation during query is O(mn). Although some costly computations
are involved in FSCon and BuildIndex, such as graph sequentialization, they are
unavoidable for building a graph index. And more importantly, they are executed
for only one time during the whole scheme. Apart from these computations, the
encryption of the data vector or the query vector only needs two multiplications of
a (n+ 1) (n+ 1) matrix and a (n+ 1)-dimensional vector with complexity O(n2)
in BuildIndex or TDGen, respectively. Besides, to avoid the high computation cost
of inverting two high-dimension matrices in TDGen, every query vector is encrypted
by the two matrices M1 and M2 themselves, instead of their inverses of M1 and M2
utilized in the secure Euclidean distance computation. Correspondingly, the costly
inverting operation is transferred to the one-time index construction procedure.
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4.5.3.3 Privacy
With the randomness introduced by the splitting process and the random numbers
rj and t, our scheme can generate two totally dierent trapdoors for the same query
graph Q. This nondeterministic property of the trapdoor generation can guarantee
the trapdoor unlinkability.
Recall that the data vector encryption with matrices has been proved to be
secure against known-plaintext attack in [120], the index privacy is protected unless
the secret key K is disclosed. The number of equations as 2(n+1)m in (M 11 )T ~gi0 =
Ii[1] and (M
 1
2 )
T ~gi
00 = Ii[2] is still less than the number of unknowns as the sum
of 2(n + 1)m unknowns in m data vectors and 2(n + 1)2 unknowns in fM1;M2g.
Therefore, the attacker cannot solve the equations.
As mentioned above, in the secure inner product computation technique, the
primary reason why the statistical analysis attack works is that the nal inner
product yi has the scale relationship with i. And this scale relationship exists just
because yi is a multiple of the original inner product gi  q which is equal to i. Our
proposed scheme introduces randomness in both gi and q to break the equivalence
relationship between gi  q and i. As a consequence, the value of gi  q does not
completely depend on i. In the case where data graph Gi contain fewer query
features than data graph Gj, it is still possible that gi  q  gj  q. Moreover, the
extended dimension t is utilized to break the direct scale relationship between yi
and gi  q, which further eliminates the indirect scale relationship between yi and
i. So the cloud server cannot deduce the special ratio as
i+1
i
which is used to
detect the inclusion relationship between two query feature sets as discussed in
the previous section 4.5.1. Without disclosing such inclusion relationship, the cloud
server cannot compute the support of a single feature. In other words, the statistical
analysis cannot break the feature privacy, and all the expected privacy requirements
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in section 4.4.3 are being met by the proposed scheme.
4.6 Experimental Evaluations
In this section, we demonstrate a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed
scheme on the AIDS antiviral screen dataset [5] that is widely used in graph query
related works [38, 91, 128, 132, 133]. It contains 42; 390 compounds with totally 62
distinct vertex labels. The 5 datasets in our experiment, as same as in [128], are
G2000, G4000, G6000, G8000, and G10000, where GN contains N graphs randomly chosen
from the AIDS dataset. We also adopt the same 6 sets of query graphs Q4, Q8, Q12,
Q16, Q20 and Q24, where Qi contains i query graphs with i edges. Default dataset
and query graphs are set as G4000 andQ4 in our experiment, respectively. gSpan [127]
is used as the frequent subgraph mining algorithm in our scheme. The maximum
size of frequent subgraph maxL is set to 11, and the minimum support  for feature
Fj is dened as follows,  = 1 if jV (Fj)j < 5; otherwise,  =
q
jV (Fj)j
maxL
minsup  jGj,
where the default minsup is set to 10% and jGj is the size of dataset. Graph
boosting toolbox [81] is utilized to implement gSpan algorithm and check subgraph
isomorphism, and the public utility routines by Numerical Recipes are employed to
compute the inverse of matrix. The query performance in our scheme is evaluated
on the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) in which we deploy the basic 64-
bit Linux Amazon Machine Image (AMI) with 4 CPU cores (2  1:2GHz); the
performance of other procedures in our scheme, such as index construction and
trapdoor generation related to data owners or data users, is evaluated on a 2:8GHz
CPU with Redhat Linux. The compared schemes are gIndex [128] and TreePi [132],
and their performance data are provided in [132] which are also run on a 2:8GHz
CPU with RedHat Linux.
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Figure 4.5: Relation between minimum support and other parameters.
4.6.1 False Positive and Index Construction
The minimum support determines the threshold for a subgraph of being an indexed
feature. Specically, the large value of minimum support means that only very
frequent subgraphs in the dataset could be treated as valid in the ltering procedure.
However, such high requirement will reduce the number of features included in the
index whose pruning power would be directly aected. With the decreasing number
of indexed features, the query graph can only be represented by less number of
query features, and therefore more and more data graphs, which does not contain
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Figure 4.6: Index construction cost.
the query graph Q but contain all the graphs in the smaller size query feature set
FQ, are included in the candidate supergraph set GFQ . As demonstrated in Fig. 4.5
where four dierent minimum supports through adjusting minsup from 8% to 11%
are examined, the false positive ratio dened as
jGFQ j
jGfQgj raises in accordance with
the minsup. Although the minimum support should be set as small as possible to
prune as many data graphs as possible, the larger one will introduce more storage
cost of index due to the larger size of frequent feature set as shown in Fig. 4.6(a).
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4.5(a), the size of the frequent feature set increases
in a lower speed when the dataset is larger than 600, while the minimum support
103
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
# of graphs in the dataset
Tr
ap
do
or
 s
ize
 (K
B)
Figure 4.7: Trapdoor size in dierent dataset
 =
q
jV (Fj)j
maxL
minsup  jGj increases linearly with the size of dataset. As a result,
there will be increasing false positives in the candidate supergraph set, which is
validated in Fig. 4.5(b).
As shown in Fig. 4.5(a), our frequent feature set is larger than that in the other
two related works since our scheme does not adopt the shrinking process on the
frequent set by choosing discriminative subgraphs. Besides, the false positive ra-
tio in our scheme is almost same as that in gSpan and a little larger than the
scheme Tree+4 [132], through the performance data provided in [132]. As shown in
Fig. 4.6(b), because our index construction involves the encryption process on data
vectors, the time cost here is about four times larger than that in other schemes
which only deal with plaintext index. Note that this construction is only a one-time
procedure in the whole scheme.
4.6.2 Trapdoor Generation and Query
Like index construction, every trapdoor generation incurs two multiplications of
a matrix and a split query vector, whose dimensionality becomes larger with the
increasing number of documents in dataset. As demonstrated in Fig. 4.8(a), the
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Figure 4.8: Trapdoor generation time.
time to generate a trapdoor is linear with the number of data graphs in the dataset.
Fig. 4.8(b) demonstrates the trapdoor generation cost is almost linear with the size
of query graph, which is dened as the number of edges in the query graph. Such
linearity is caused by the fact that the major costly operation mapping query graph
to vector is roughly determined by query size since all the query features should be
mapped.
In the query process in our scheme design, the cloud server executes the ltering
process by computing the inner product of trapdoor and each encrypted data vector.
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Figure 4.9: Query execution time on server.
Fig. 4.9 shows that the query time is almost linear with the number of data graphs
in the dataset. Although the query time in our scheme is much larger than that in
gSpan, whose query time is around 100 milliseconds presented in [38], our scheme
is performing query on the encrypted index. With respect to the communication
cost in the query procedure, the size of trapdoor is the same as that of subindex for
single data graph. As shown in Fig. 4.7, the size of trapdoor keeps constant in the
same dataset, no matter how many features are contained in a query graph.
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4.7 Related Work
4.7.1 Graph Containment Query
To reduce the computation cost caused by checking subgraph isomorphism, most
research on plaintext graph containment query problem follows the \ltering-and-
verication" framework [38, 91, 92, 128, 132, 133] to decrease the size of candidate
supergraph set. Feature-based index has been increasingly explored by choosing
dierent substructures as features. Shasha et al. [92] designed a path-based in-
dex approach. However, paths carry few structural information and therefore have
limited ltering power. Yan et al. [128] proposed gIndex to build index from fre-
quent and discriminative subgraphs which can carry more structure characteristics.
Zhang et al. [132] utilized frequent and discriminative subtrees instead of subgraphs
to build the index. Recently, Chase and Kamara proposed structured encryption [36]
to handle private access to parts of a large graph in encrypted form; yet only simple
operations such as neighbor queries are supported. Portions of the work studied in
this chapter were presented as extended abstract at the 31th International Confer-
ence on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'11) [31].
4.7.2 Keyword-based Searchable Encryption
Traditional single keyword searchable encryption schemes [22, 40, 65, 106] usually
build an encrypted searchable index such that its content is hidden to the server
unless it is given appropriate trapdoors generated via secret key(s) [58]. To en-
rich search semantics, conjunctive keyword search [24] over encrypted data have
been proposed. These schemes incur large overhead caused by their fundamental
primitives, such as computation cost by bilinear map [24].As a more general search
approach, predicate encryption schemes [63] are recently proposed to support both
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conjunctive and disjunctive search. However, none of existing boolean keyword
searchable encryption schemes support graph semantics as we propose to explore in
this chapter.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, for the rst time, we dene and solve the problem of query over
encrypted graph-structured cloud data, and establish a variety of privacy require-
ments. For the eciency consideration, we adopt the principle of \ltering-and-
verication" to prune as many negative data graphs as possible before verication,
where a feature-based index is pre-built to provide feature-related information for
every encrypted data graph. Then, we choose the inner product as the pruning tool
to carry out the ltering procedure eciently. To meet the challenge of supporting
graph semantics, we propose a secure inner product computation technique, and then
improve it to achieve various privacy requirements under the known-background
threat model. Thorough analysis investigating privacy and eciency of our scheme
is given, and the evaluation further shows our scheme introduces low overhead on
computation and communication.
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FSCon(G; )
1. Mine frequent feature set F = fF1; F2; : : : ; Fng from graph dataset G with the minimum
support threshold ;
i) For each frequent feature Fj, where 1  j  n, generate its supergraph id set GfFjg;
2. Create the frequent feature dictionary D = fLF1 ;LF2 ; : : : ;LFng, where LFj is the unique
canonical label of Fj;
3. Build the feature-based inverted index Iinv = fGfF1g;GfF2g; : : : ;GfFngg.
KeyGen(KS; n)
1. Create an (n+ 1)-bit vector S, two (n+ 1) (n+ 1) invertible matrices M1;M2,
and an n-dimensional vector ;
i) fS;M1;M2; g R   KS;
2. Output the secret key K = fS;M1;M2; g.
BuildIndex(Iinv;K)
1. Create a n n matrix X, where X[i][j] is a random number less than K[4][j];
2. For each graph Gi, where 1  i  m, create a n-dimensional data vector gi;
i) If id(Gi) 2 Iinv[j], set gi[j] = K[4][j]; otherwise, set gi[j] = X[i][j];
3. Extend every gi to (n+ 1)-dimensional ~gi;
i) For 1  j  n, set ~gi[j] = gi[j]; Set ~gi[n+1] = 1;
4. According to the splitting indicator K[1], split every ~gi to two vectors ~gi0 and ~gi00;
i) For 1  j  n+ 1, if K[1][j] = 0, set both ~gi0[j] and ~gi00[j] as ~gi[j];
otherwise, set ~gi
0
[j] and ~gi
00
[j] as two random numbers such that ~gi
0
[j] + ~gi
00
[j] = ~gi[j];
5. Encrypt these two vectors by inverses of the two matrices, and combine them as the
subindex Ii for Gi;
i) Ii = f((K[2]) 1)T ~gi0; ((K[3]) 1)T ~gi00g;
6. Output the encrypted index I = fI1; I2;    ; Img.
TDGen(Q;D;K)
1. Initialize the query feature set: FQ = ;;
2. For each frequent feature D[j], 1  j  n: if D[j]  Q, FQ = FQ
SfD[j]g;
3. Create a n-dimensional query vector q for the input query graph Q;
i) Generate n positive random numbers as r1; r2; : : : ; rn;
ii) For 1  j  n, if D[j] 2 FQ, set q[j] = rj; otherwise, set q[j] = 0;
4. Extend q to (n+ 1)-dimensional ~q, and generate a random number t;
i) For 1  j  n, set ~q[j] = q[j]; Set ~q[n+1] = t;
5. According to the splitting indicator K[1], split ~q to two vectors as ~q0 and ~q00;
i) For 1  j  n+ 1, if K[1][j] = 1, set both ~q0[j] and ~q00[j] as ~q[j];
otherwise, set ~q0[j] and ~q00[j] as two random numbers such that ~q0[j] + ~q00[j] = ~q[j];
6. Encrypt these two vectors by the two invertible matrices as f(K[2])T~q0; (K[3])T~q00g;
7. Output the trapdoor TQ for query graph Q;
i) TQ = f(K[2])T~q0; (K[3])T~q00;
PK[4][j]q[j] + tg;
Query(I; TQ)
1. Initialize the query result: GFQ = ;;
2. For each subindex I[i], 1  i  m:
i) Compute inner product as Ii[1]  TQ[1] + Ii[2]  TQ[2];
ii) If the inner product is equal to TQ[3], set GFQ = GFQ
Sfid(Gi)g;
3. Output the query result GFQ .
Figure 4.10: Privacy-Preserving Graph Query Scheme
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we investigated and addressed the fundamental problem of
secure and reliable data outsourcing in Cloud Computing. We summarize our results
as follows.
In Chapter 2, we address the problem of secure and reliable cloud storage with
eciency consideration of both data repair and data retrieval. By utilizing a near-
optimal erasure codes, specically LT codes, our designed storage service has faster
decoding during data retrieval than existing solutions. To minimize the data repair
complexity, we employ the exact repair method to eciently recover the exact form
of any corrupted data. Such a design also reduces the data owner's cost during
data repair since no verication tag needs to be generated (old verication tags
can be recovered as data recovery). Our proposed cloud storage service provides a
better overall eciency of data retrieval and repair than existing counterparts. It
also greatly reduces cost and completely releases the data owner from the burden
of being online by enabling public integrity check and exact repair.
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In Chapter 3, we address the problem of privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked
search over encrypted data in cloud computing. We establish a set of strict privacy
requirements for such a secure cloud data utilization system. Among various multi-
keyword semantics, we choose the ecient similarity measure of \coordinate match-
ing", i.e., as many matches as possible, to capture the relevance of data documents
to the search query. We further use \inner product similarity" to quantitatively
evaluate such similarity measure. We rst propose a basic idea for ranked keyword
search based on secure inner product computation, and then give two signicantly
improved schemes to achieve various stringent privacy requirements in two dier-
ent threat models. We also investigate some further enhancements of our ranked
search mechanism, including supporting more search semantics, i.e., TF  IDF, and
dynamic data operations.
In Chapter 4, we address the problem of privacy-preserving query over en-
crypted graph-structured data in cloud computing. Our work utilizes the princi-
ple of \ltering-and-verication". We pre-build a feature-based index to provide
feature-related information about each encrypted data graph, and then choose the
ecient inner product as the pruning tool to carry out the ltering procedure. To
meet the challenge of supporting graph query without privacy breaches, we pro-
pose a secure inner product computation technique, and then improve it to achieve
various privacy requirements under the known-background threat model.
5.2 Future Work
We identify a few challenging issues for future work on secure and reliable data
outsourcing in cloud computing as follows.
As presented in our proposed cloud data storage service, the availability in data
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retrieval is guaranteed by the decodability detection before data outsourcing and the
exact repair of corrupted data. Once the encoding conguration successfully passes
the decodability detection, it can be reused for all the storage services that species
the same reliability level in terms of n and k. However, such detection computation
still takes nonnegligible cost when every cloud user may have its own expected
reliability requirement. We plan to investigate more ecient decodability detection
algorithm which will make such cloud storage solution more practical. Besides, in
cloud computing, the outsourced data might not only be accessed but also updated
by the data owners, e.g., through block modication, deletion and insertion, etc.
Hence, we also plan to investigate supporting dynamic data operations which can
be of vital importance to the practical application of data outsourcing services.
In our proposed data utilization solutions as presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4,
the query computation cost in the server side is linear with the number of documents
in the dataset. Currently data owners outsource more and more data into cloud
servers, so it is of practical use to make the query faster. To address this problem,
we plan to explore more ecient search algorithm based on tree structures [73, 83].
We further plan to investigate new security and privacy problems in the untrusted
cloud server model. In practice, cloud servers may sometimes behave beyond the
known background model. This can happen either because cloud server intentionally
wants to do so for saving cost when handling large number of search requests, or
there may be software bugs, or internal/external attacks. Thus, enabling a search
result authentication mechanism that can detect such unexpected behaviors of cloud
server is also of practical interest and worth further investigation. Our early work
has been aware of this problem, and provided a solution to authenticating ranked
search result [104], but only for single keyword search.
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